James Blair Historical Review by College of William and Mary et al.
III ~ 201
THE JAMES BLAIR
HISTORICAL REVIEW
VOLUME 
The Jam
es B
lair H
istorical R
eview
 
       Volum
e III ~ 2012
2
The James Blair
Historical Review
 Editorial Board
Kyra Zemanick, Editor-in-Chief
Andrew Frantz, Managing Editor
Andrew Fickley, Submissions Editor
Mason Watson, Layout Editor
Caitlin Patterson, Business Manager
Diana Ohanian, Publicity Manager
Alex Hopkins, Publicity Manager
Peer reviewers
Faculty Advisor
Dr. Hiroshi Kitamura
James Blake
Paul Burgess
Ciara Cryst
Stephen D’Alessio
Ashley Deluce
Taylor Feenstra
Grant Gill
Abby Gomulkiewicz
Lauren Greene
Stephen Hurley
Tracy Jenkins
Camille Lorei
Molly Michie
Mira Nair
Emily Patterson
Chase Hopkins
Amy Schaffman
Online: In addition to this printed issue, the James Blair Historical 
Review can also be accessed online at www.wm.edu/as/history/under-
graduateprogram/The-James-Blair-Historical-Review/index.php.
Cover: Detail. Thomas Whitcombe, Battle of the Nile, Augt. 1st 1798, 
1816, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London. Image courtesy 
of the National Maritime Museum. 
The James Blair
Historical Review
 Editorial Board
Kyra Zemanick, Editor-in-Chief
Andrew Frantz, Managing Editor
Andrew Fickley, Submissions Editor
Mason Watson, Layout Editor
Caitlin Patterson, Business Manager
Diana Ohanian, Publicity Manager
Alex Hopkins, Publicity Manager
Peer reviewers
Faculty Advisor
Dr. Hiroshi Kitamura
James Blake
Paul Burgess
Ciara Cryst
Stephen D’Alessio
Ashley Deluce
Taylor Feenstra
Grant Gill
Abby Gomulkiewicz
Lauren Greene
Stephen Hurley
Tracy Jenkins
Camille Lorei
Molly Michie
Mira Nair
Emily Patterson
Chase Hopkins
Amy Schaffman
Online: In addition to this printed issue, the James Blair Historical 
Review can also be accessed online at www.wm.edu/as/history/under-
graduateprogram/The-James-Blair-Historical-Review/index.php.
Cover: Detail. Thomas Whitcombe, Battle of the Nile, Augt. 1st 1798, 
1816, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London. Image courtesy 
of the National Maritime Museum. 
The James Blair
Historical Review
 Editorial Board
Kyra Zemanick, Editor-in-Chief
Andrew Frantz, Managing Editor
Andrew Fickley, Submissions Editor
Mason Watson, Layout Editor
Caitlin Patterson, Business Manager
Diana Ohanian, Publicity Manager
Alex Hopkins, Publicity Manager
Peer reviewers
Faculty Advisor
Dr. Hiroshi Kitamura
James Blake
Paul Burgess
Ciara Cryst
Stephen D’Alessio
Ashley Deluce
Taylor Feenstra
Grant Gill
Abby Gomulkiewicz
Lauren Greene
Stephen Hurley
Tracy Jenkins
Camille Lorei
Molly Michie
Mira Nair
Emily Patterson
Chase Hopkins
Amy Schaffman
Online: In addition to this printed issue, the James Blair Historical 
Review can also be accessed online at www.wm.edu/as/history/under-
graduateprogram/The-James-Blair-Historical-Review/index.php.
Cover: Detail. Thomas Whitcombe, Battle of the Nile, Augt. 1st 1798, 
1816, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London. Image courtesy 
of the National Maritime Museum. 
The James Blair
Historical Review
 Editorial Board
Kyra Zemanick, Editor-in-Chief
Andrew Frantz, Managing Editor
Andrew Fickley, Submissions Editor
Mason Watson, Layout Editor
Caitlin Patterson, Business Manager
Diana Ohanian, Publicity Manager
Alex Hopkins, Publicity Manager
Peer reviewers
Faculty Advisor
Dr. Hiroshi Kitamura
James Blake
Paul Burgess
Ciara Cryst
Stephen D’Alessio
Ashley Deluce
Taylor Feenstra
Grant Gill
Abby Gomulkiewicz
Lauren Greene
Stephen Hurley
Tracy Jenkins
Camille Lorei
Molly Michie
Mira Nair
Emily Patterson
Chase Hopkins
Amy Schaffman
Online: In addition to this printed issue, the James Blair Historical 
Review can also be accessed online at www.wm.edu/as/history/under-
graduateprogram/The-James-Blair-Historical-Review/index.php.
Cover: Detail. Thomas Whitcombe, Battle of the Nile, Augt. 1st 1798, 
1816, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London. Image courtesy 
of the National Maritime Museum. 
Editor’s Note: 
 The academic year opened with a rumble, quite literally. 
Between an earthquake and a subsequent hurricane, the College 
faced a beating from Mother Nature. Yet no weather-related phe-
nomenon could deter William & Mary’s exceptional history stu-
dents, who produced a wide variety of scholarship in the semesters 
that followed. Now in its third year, the James Blair Historical 
Review wishes to recognize those students who exemplify the best 
of undergraduate history research.
 From an analysis of letters of a Confederate soldier to the 
published works of an Egyptian scholar, this year’s volume trans-
ports readers to the far regions of the globe. North America, Eu-
rope, and Africa all appear in the four published essays, acting not 
only as settings from which these histories unfold but gateways to 
further understanding of the authors’ international interests. I com-
mend these students for the breadth and quality of their research, 
and I look forward to what their future studies may bring.
 The journal also had its own share of accomplishments 
this year. Among these achievements include its first constitution 
and website, recognition by the Office of Student Activities, and 
membership on the Publications Council. I am further proud of the 
journal’s collaboration with the Lyon G. Tyler Department of His-
tory in the creation of a Best Essay Award. This $300 scholarship 
will be awarded to the student whose published essay best embod-
ies original research. Please join me in congratulating this year’s 
winner, Tony Walters, whose essay on the letters of Charles Wills 
unquestionably deserves this honor.
 My fellow editors and I would like to thank Professor Hiro-
shi Kitamura, the Publications Council, the Lyon G. Tyler Depart-
ment of History, and our peer reviewers for their continued support 
over the past three years. We hope that this issue of the James Blair 
Historical Review will be one to remember and enjoy.
Sincerely,
Kyra Zemanick
Editor-in-Chief
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primarily interested in medieval studies. 
He studied abroad in Nottingham, United 
Kingdom, in the spring of 2011. After 
graduation, he will be looking for jobs in 
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Meredith Duffy is a junior majoring in 
history and government. Her historical 
interests include modern Central Euro-
pean history, especially turn of the century 
Austrian history. She is president of the 
William & Mary Fencing Club and also 
works as a part-time historical interpreter 
at Jamestown Settlement. After graduation, she intends to pur-
sue work in intelligence analysis or international development.
Stephen Hurley is a senior majoring in 
history and Chinese. His primary histori-
cal interests include twentieth-century 
China, wartime occupation, and commu-
nist nationalism. He is currently examin-
ing the intersection of these areas in his 
honors thesis, “Shame of a Nation: The 
Evolution of Hanjian since the Late Qing,” and hopes to return 
to China after graduation for further language study. Stephen 
is also a member of William & Mary Rock Climbing and the 
William & Mary Chinese Dance Troupe.
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Walters the Wills PaPers
The Wills Papers: 
Desertion in the Confederate Army through the Eyes 
of a Bedford Farmer
 
 “Dear and affectionate Wife, this evening I seat myself to 
drop you a few lines to let you know I am well.”1 So begin many of 
the letters Charles A. Wills sent to his wife Mary Jane Wills over the 
course of his military service with the Confederate States of Amer-
ica, beginning in February 9, 1863, and ending with his death on 
June 16, 1864.2 Charles Wills was a farmer from Bedford County 
with a wife and three young sons when he felt compelled to enlist 
in the Confederate army, and he soon came to regret that decision. 
Wills’ letters to his wife, along with the few surviving letters that 
Charles received from his wife Mary Jane, serve on one level as a 
loving correspondence between husband and wife, filled with in-
teresting details on specifics of war and home life during the Civil 
War. On a separate level, they provide a fascinating look at deser-
tion during the time of the Confederacy, depicting how strongly he 
desired to return home to his family and how omnipresent desertion 
was in the Confederate army. The Wills papers provide an intimate 
look not only at the multiple causes for desertion for poor, rural 
Southwestern Virginians, but also causes for remaining in the army.
 Desertion remains one of the less studied subjects covered 
by Civil War historians. Although it is a decidedly inglorious topic, 
it played a huge part of the Civil War and must be mentioned in 
most scholarship concerning the war’s military sphere. The seminal 
text for desertion as a primary topic is Ella Lonn’s 1928 book De-
sertion During the Civil War. Lonn thoroughly examines desertion 
in the armies of the North and the South, analyzing causes of de-
sertion, methods used by deserters, methods to stop desertion, and 
how desertion affected the outcome of the war. Indeed, her research 
is impressive, drawing from a variety of state and public documents 
Tony Walters
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as well as newspapers and military and personal reminiscences. 
However, the writing seems dated, with Lonn consistently refer-
ring to desertion as an “evil.” Furthermore, Lonn rarely questions 
the reliance of her sources, since it is doubtful that even official 
documents are safe to rely on for an issue as complex as deser-
tion. A smaller study by Peter S. Bearman concerning local identi-
ties undermining army solidarity and increasing desertion proved a 
worthwhile supplement to Lonn’s work, and additional pieces like 
Mark Weitz’s A Higher Duty or Reid Mitchell’s The Vacant Chair 
offer more modern approaches to desertion. Their conclusions, al-
beit more detailed and reliable, are not different than the ones of-
fered by Lonn.
 The Wills letters lie at the center of this narrative. The col-
lection of 47 letters exchanged between Charles and Mary Jane 
Wills make up an incomplete yet worthwhile correspondence 
between a Bedford farmer in military service and his wife left in 
charge of his farm. The letters are primarily composed of those 
from Charles to Mary as his company, the 1st Virginia Regiment, 
moved around Virginia and North Carolina. Though the letters 
comprise only a fraction of their correspondence, with few letters 
from Mary, they reveal mysteries about Charles and Mary’s rela-
tionship. For instance, their exchanges involve discreet hints and 
suggestions instead of explicit requests, such as Mary’s attempts 
to convince Charles to return home. Likewise, Charles’ habit of re-
peating details of Mary’s letters to him suggest how much he ap-
preciated hearing from her. Lee A. Wallace’s 1st Virginia Infantry 
regimental history provides important context to his letters.
 Charles Admire Wills, affectionately known as “Ad,” began 
his tenure in the Confederate army with his enlistment on February 
9, 1863, at the age of 34. He left behind a wife, Mary Jane, age 39, 
and three children: William, age 6, Charles, age 5, and Jesse, age 
4. He enlisted in the 1st Virginia Regiment and was a member of 
Company I.3 He saw little military action until July of 1863, when 
he took part in the Battle of Gettysburg, where he was presum-
ably wounded in the arm. Although the letters do not describe the 
battle, his first letter after Gettysburg, from Camp Winder Hospital 
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as well as newspapers and military and personal reminiscences. 
However, the writing seems dated, with Lonn consistently refer-
ring to desertion as an “evil.” Furthermore, Lonn rarely questions 
the reliance of her sources, since it is doubtful that even official 
documents are safe to rely on for an issue as complex as deser-
tion. A smaller study by Peter S. Bearman concerning local identi-
ties undermining army solidarity and increasing desertion proved a 
worthwhile supplement to Lonn’s work, and additional pieces like 
Mark Weitz’s A Higher Duty or Reid Mitchell’s The Vacant Chair 
offer more modern approaches to desertion. Their conclusions, al-
beit more detailed and reliable, are not different than the ones of-
fered by Lonn.
 The Wills letters lie at the center of this narrative. The col-
lection of 47 letters exchanged between Charles and Mary Jane 
Wills make up an incomplete yet worthwhile correspondence 
between a Bedford farmer in military service and his wife left in 
charge of his farm. The letters are primarily composed of those 
from Charles to Mary as his company, the 1st Virginia Regiment, 
moved around Virginia and North Carolina. Though the letters 
comprise only a fraction of their correspondence, with few letters 
from Mary, they reveal mysteries about Charles and Mary’s rela-
tionship. For instance, their exchanges involve discreet hints and 
suggestions instead of explicit requests, such as Mary’s attempts 
to convince Charles to return home. Likewise, Charles’ habit of re-
peating details of Mary’s letters to him suggest how much he ap-
preciated hearing from her. Lee A. Wallace’s 1st Virginia Infantry 
regimental history provides important context to his letters.
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in Richmond, Virginia, and following letters complain of his loss of 
the use of his arm. After briefly being transferred to the Chimborazo 
Hospital, Richmond, he eventually resumed duty with his division, 
spending time at camps in North Carolina. He participated in the 
capture of Plymouth, which he wrote of in great detail, and also in 
the beginnings of military action around Petersburg, where he was 
killed on Drury’s Bluff on June 16, 1864.
 Charles’ letters tended to share many similarities. Already 
noted was his habit of repeating information from his wife’s letters 
to him in letters back to her, acknowledging what he thought of 
such information. He often spent time discussing his opinion of the 
war, especially prospects for peace. He regularly had instructions 
regarding the upkeep of the farm or questions about the state of the 
farm. He was sure to let Mary Jane know how much he missed her 
and the children. Finally, he always mentioned the Lord, asking for 
prayer and encouraging Christian ideals, sometimes for the major-
ity of letters.
 Within these standard writings lay details of his action and 
life in the Confederate army. Wills spoke of harsh conditions and 
items he wanted to be sent to him. He included prices of things he 
had bought, as well information regarding his pay and how much 
he could send home. He would describe typical details such as how 
many miles he had marched, what the weather was like, or what he 
had eaten recently. However, one of the more compelling recurring 
themes in his letters was desertion. Many of his letters included 
stories about deserters in his regiment, how they escaped and how 
some were punished. One of Mary Jane’s letters to him included 
details about deserters in Bedford County. Coupled with his obvi-
ous yearning to return home, this focus on desertion clearly indi-
cates that Charles strongly entertained the thought of desertion.
 Lonn devotes an entire chapter in Desertion During the 
Civil War to identifying the general causes of desertion, and a great 
many of these reasons could apply to Wills. However, several of 
Lonn’s theories should be discounted in the case of Wills. For in-
stance, Lonn claims that soldiers who were conscripted or hired 
as substitutes were often the most likely to desert.4 According to 
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all sources, Wills enlisted in the Confederate army out of his own 
free will. An account of Charles’ service by one of his descendants 
claims that “several years into the Civil War, Charles Admire felt 
that he must defend his land and the South.”5 There are no com-
plaints in his letters regarding the injustice of his situation, despite 
expressions of regret and desire to return home. It was likely that he 
was unaware of the magnitude of his commitment, as his first letter 
sent on February 15, 1863, told Mary Jane to stay happy because 
he hoped to return soon. “They say there’s a very good prospect 
for peace,” Charles wrote in the same letter, a sentiment that would 
change within the next few months.6 No matter how misguided he 
may have been in his enlistment, there is no evidence that supports 
any possibility of him joining the army against his will.
 Lonn cites cowardice as another common reason for deser-
tion.7 Though Charles may have been afraid of combat, there were 
no reasons to believe he was a coward. His participation in the Bat-
tle of Gettysburg, subsequent wound, and continued service despite 
having a useless arm qualified him as a brave and dedicated soldier. 
His action in the capture of Plymouth, as well as his eventual death 
in combat at Drury’s Bluff, likewise suggests that cowardice was 
not a significant influence on his temptation to desert. Although he 
frequently wrote that he hoped to be kept out of battle, these state-
ments may have been simply reassurances to his wife, whom he 
constantly asked not to worry about him.
 Peter S. Bearman maintains that men deserted from the 
Confederate army because a strong sense of localism in their com-
panies eroded nationalistic feelings as Southerners. This pattern did 
not appear to be the case with Charles, because his enlistment in the 
1st Virginia Infantry was at Lynchburg in 1862, after the regiment 
had been well established with men from other regions. His letters 
indicate that while he had some friends from home in his regiment, 
the 1st was a very heterogeneous company. In fact, Charles’ main 
sense of allegiance seemed to be to his family, not his county. De-
spite Lonn’s emphasis on mountainous rural areas producing more 
deserters, a thorough analysis of Bedford County Civil War records 
do not reveal extraordinary rates of desertion rates compared to 
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general trends.8
 Discounting a lack of agency and cowardice, Lonn’s other 
causes of desertion seem to apply directly to Wills. One of the most 
common causes for desertion was the “lack of most ordinary neces-
sities for the soldier-food, clothing, pay, and equipment.”9 Wills’ 
letters strongly support this statement. Many of his letters home 
include requests for things to be sent to him, such as tobacco, boiled 
eggs, and butter. To him, his requests were essential in supplement-
ing his meager rations, as he suggests on February 22, 1864: “I fare 
as the rest do and very poorly at that, we draw a pound of pork 3 
days and a pound of bread a day.”10 Indeed, the lack of food in the 
army was enough to lead to the end of the war, as he expressed on 
March 25, 1864: “I think the war will end soon for want of some-
thing to eat, men think the south is in a better condition for peace 
than it ever was.”11
 As for clothes and medical treatment, Wills endured less 
hardship. His letter sent on March 16, 1864, detailed that he had to 
throw out some of his clothes on account of having accumulated 
too much.12 While he sometimes had to wait to draw clothes or 
blankets, he regularly reported sleeping comfortably in the winter. 
As for his wounded arm, Wills reported frequent visits to the doctor 
and plenty of medical attention. For instance, on March 18, 1864, 
he wrote about having a “tincture,” a botanical mixture dissolved in 
alcohol often used medicinally.13 Although he ever regained the use 
of his arm, he appeared to receive appropriate medical attention, at 
least by the atrociously low standards of the Civil War.
 Wills may have felt strongly about the war when he enlisted 
in the army, but as time passed, his feelings altered significantly. 
According to Lonn, a commonly held opinion amongst Confeder-
ate soldiers was that the war was “a rich man’s war but a poor man’s 
fight,” and Wills’ letters strongly confirm this sentiment.14 On June 
12, 1863, he lamented, “It looks like there will never be peace any 
more for poor people the rich getting out of the war on every hand 
there is no chance for the poor to get out.”15 Wills was not wealthy 
by any means, and the longer he spent in his regiment surrounded 
by privates of similar statuses, the more distanced he felt from the 
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there is no chance for the poor to get out.”15 Wills was not wealthy 
by any means, and the longer he spent in his regiment surrounded 
by privates of similar statuses, the more distanced he felt from the 
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upper class. He seemed to have little interest in the politics of the 
war, dryly remarking on March 28, 1863, that he did not plan to 
vote unless there was a peace party he could support.16 It is likely 
he was echoing the thoughts of those around him.
 Consequently, the most pressing factor in Wills’ desire to 
desert was homesickness and a desire to be with his family. Repeat-
edly, his letters express his longing for home, such as this example 
on April 30, 1863: “You wrote to me if you had 1000 worlds you 
would give them for me to be with you. I would give any sum if I 
could be with you Mary.”17 The sense of yearning for his wife and 
children is at times overwhelming, and it is clear that he regret-
ted leaving them immediately. All of his letters included statements 
about how much he missed his family, as well as how badly he 
wanted to come home. His desire to return home was made further 
obvious by his strong desire for Mary’s letters. On May 28, 1863, 
Wills mentioned “I haven’t received a letter since Sanders came 
down Mary not that I grumble but I want to read a letter from you 
very bad you are my only thought with the exception of the lord and 
our little children.”18 He had friends amongst his fellow soldiers, 
but his strongest ties were unquestionably to his family.
 Wills’ concern for his family extended into concern for his 
farm, for many of his letters include instructions or questions re-
garding agricultural work. In several letters, Wills advises his wife 
to plant Irish and sweet potatoes, enlist the aid of various family 
friends in plowing, and take good care of their hogs. Toward the 
end of their correspondence, Wills encouraged Mary to shell her 
corn and draw all the provisions she could, due to the Confeder-
acy’s worsening food conditions. There were no details too small 
for Wills, and it was apparent he wanted to resume his life on his 
farm.19
 Yet knowing that his family endured hardships proved the 
most difficult for Wills. He regularly told Mary that if she was ill he 
would speak with his officers in order to obtain a furlough, although 
it was impossible. His concern for the farm seemed to be so that his 
family had enough to eat, and he seemed to send money home for 
his family fairly often. On May 18, 1863, Wills sent a dejected let-
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ter explaining that 1000 Confederate dollars were only worth 120 
in silver and gold and encouraged Mary to spend money sooner 
rather than later on supplies.20 He bemoaned their fate on January 
29, 1864, saying, “I don’t see how the poor is to live they must look 
for there selves if they stay in the army, they will all starve I fear,” 
as the inflationary prices of goods rose and the value of currency 
fell.21 Wills always expressed happiness whenever he heard friends 
or relatives had been to stay with Mary or help her with her work, 
and he regularly told her he would be home soon.
 The letters he received from Mary did not help his resolve 
to stay in the army. Despite telling him that she was well, Mary 
regularly spoke of the difficulties of farm life and the toll it was 
taking on her. On May 22, 1863, she wrote to her husband, “I never 
seen as hard times in my life and I have all my business to attend 
to that I never had to do when you was here O how I miss you in 
everything I know I have the best husband in this world and Lord 
send you home to me I pray Ad.”22 Wills could not have endured his 
wife’s begging easily.
 There were reasons to suspect Mary was actively encour-
aging Wills to desert. One telling detail was that deserters were a 
frequent topic of Wills’ letters, as he explained their methods and 
their fates. While there are no explicit expressions of his desire to 
desert, his statement on May 24, 1864, was hardly innocent: “A 
man wants to see his family and he will make use of any way he 
can to get home.”23 Even more suspicious were requests for Mary 
not to write anything to him that she would not want anybody else 
to see. On February 22, 1864, after he described the execution of a 
deserter, Wills asked, “Mary don’t wright anything they can make 
against me, they might get a letter when I aint here I might be sent 
to the hospital or somewhere.”24 Clearly, the couple was having dis-
cussions that could have gotten Wills in trouble with his superiors, 
and desertion was most likely the topic.
 While the papers held all of Wills’ reasons to desert, they 
likewise included the answers to why he did not desert. One reason 
appears to be his genuine belief that he could secure a furlough to 
see his family at some point during his service. He seemed quite 
 15 Walters the Wills PaPers
ter explaining that 1000 Confederate dollars were only worth 120 
in silver and gold and encouraged Mary to spend money sooner 
rather than later on supplies.20 He bemoaned their fate on January 
29, 1864, saying, “I don’t see how the poor is to live they must look 
for there selves if they stay in the army, they will all starve I fear,” 
as the inflationary prices of goods rose and the value of currency 
fell.21 Wills always expressed happiness whenever he heard friends 
or relatives had been to stay with Mary or help her with her work, 
and he regularly told her he would be home soon.
 The letters he received from Mary did not help his resolve 
to stay in the army. Despite telling him that she was well, Mary 
regularly spoke of the difficulties of farm life and the toll it was 
taking on her. On May 22, 1863, she wrote to her husband, “I never 
seen as hard times in my life and I have all my business to attend 
to that I never had to do when you was here O how I miss you in 
everything I know I have the best husband in this world and Lord 
send you home to me I pray Ad.”22 Wills could not have endured his 
wife’s begging easily.
 There were reasons to suspect Mary was actively encour-
aging Wills to desert. One telling detail was that deserters were a 
frequent topic of Wills’ letters, as he explained their methods and 
their fates. While there are no explicit expressions of his desire to 
desert, his statement on May 24, 1864, was hardly innocent: “A 
man wants to see his family and he will make use of any way he 
can to get home.”23 Even more suspicious were requests for Mary 
not to write anything to him that she would not want anybody else 
to see. On February 22, 1864, after he described the execution of a 
deserter, Wills asked, “Mary don’t wright anything they can make 
against me, they might get a letter when I aint here I might be sent 
to the hospital or somewhere.”24 Clearly, the couple was having dis-
cussions that could have gotten Wills in trouble with his superiors, 
and desertion was most likely the topic.
 While the papers held all of Wills’ reasons to desert, they 
likewise included the answers to why he did not desert. One reason 
appears to be his genuine belief that he could secure a furlough to 
see his family at some point during his service. He seemed quite 
 15
Walters the Wills PaPers
ter explaining that 1000 Confederate dollars were only worth 120 
in silver and gold and encouraged Mary to spend money sooner 
rather than later on supplies.20 He bemoaned their fate on January 
29, 1864, saying, “I don’t see how the poor is to live they must look 
for there selves if they stay in the army, they will all starve I fear,” 
as the inflationary prices of goods rose and the value of currency 
fell.21 Wills always expressed happiness whenever he heard friends 
or relatives had been to stay with Mary or help her with her work, 
and he regularly told her he would be home soon.
 The letters he received from Mary did not help his resolve 
to stay in the army. Despite telling him that she was well, Mary 
regularly spoke of the difficulties of farm life and the toll it was 
taking on her. On May 22, 1863, she wrote to her husband, “I never 
seen as hard times in my life and I have all my business to attend 
to that I never had to do when you was here O how I miss you in 
everything I know I have the best husband in this world and Lord 
send you home to me I pray Ad.”22 Wills could not have endured his 
wife’s begging easily.
 There were reasons to suspect Mary was actively encour-
aging Wills to desert. One telling detail was that deserters were a 
frequent topic of Wills’ letters, as he explained their methods and 
their fates. While there are no explicit expressions of his desire to 
desert, his statement on May 24, 1864, was hardly innocent: “A 
man wants to see his family and he will make use of any way he 
can to get home.”23 Even more suspicious were requests for Mary 
not to write anything to him that she would not want anybody else 
to see. On February 22, 1864, after he described the execution of a 
deserter, Wills asked, “Mary don’t wright anything they can make 
against me, they might get a letter when I aint here I might be sent 
to the hospital or somewhere.”24 Clearly, the couple was having dis-
cussions that could have gotten Wills in trouble with his superiors, 
and desertion was most likely the topic.
 While the papers held all of Wills’ reasons to desert, they 
likewise included the answers to why he did not desert. One reason 
appears to be his genuine belief that he could secure a furlough to 
see his family at some point during his service. He seemed quite 
 15 Walters the Wills PaPers
ter explaining that 1000 Confederate dollars were only worth 120 
in silver and gold and encouraged Mary to spend money sooner 
rather than later on supplies.20 He bemoaned their fate on January 
29, 1864, saying, “I don’t see how the poor is to live they must look 
for there selves if they stay in the army, they will all starve I fear,” 
as the inflationary prices of goods rose and the value of currency 
fell.21 Wills always expressed happiness whenever he heard friends 
or relatives had been to stay with Mary or help her with her work, 
and he regularly told her he would be home soon.
 The letters he received from Mary did not help his resolve 
to stay in the army. Despite telling him that she was well, Mary 
regularly spoke of the difficulties of farm life and the toll it was 
taking on her. On May 22, 1863, she wrote to her husband, “I never 
seen as hard times in my life and I have all my business to attend 
to that I never had to do when you was here O how I miss you in 
everything I know I have the best husband in this world and Lord 
send you home to me I pray Ad.”22 Wills could not have endured his 
wife’s begging easily.
 There were reasons to suspect Mary was actively encour-
aging Wills to desert. One telling detail was that deserters were a 
frequent topic of Wills’ letters, as he explained their methods and 
their fates. While there are no explicit expressions of his desire to 
desert, his statement on May 24, 1864, was hardly innocent: “A 
man wants to see his family and he will make use of any way he 
can to get home.”23 Even more suspicious were requests for Mary 
not to write anything to him that she would not want anybody else 
to see. On February 22, 1864, after he described the execution of a 
deserter, Wills asked, “Mary don’t wright anything they can make 
against me, they might get a letter when I aint here I might be sent 
to the hospital or somewhere.”24 Clearly, the couple was having dis-
cussions that could have gotten Wills in trouble with his superiors, 
and desertion was most likely the topic.
 While the papers held all of Wills’ reasons to desert, they 
likewise included the answers to why he did not desert. One reason 
appears to be his genuine belief that he could secure a furlough to 
see his family at some point during his service. He seemed quite 
 15
Spring 2012JameS Blair HiStorical review
naïve in his earliest letters, asking Mary to visit him if she could 
except for when the army was on the move. Later he became more 
aware of the realities facing soldiers who wanted to see their fami-
lies, and on March 25, 1864, he told Mary not to visit him in Golds-
buro, North Carolina, since she would not be able to spend time 
with him while he was in his regiment. He was certain his officers 
would not give him time to spend with her.25
 However, Wills may have spent some time with his fam-
ily during his service. A long gap between the letters dated August 
18, 1863, and December 28, 1863, imply this point. While the let-
ters may have been lost, letters around this time suggest Wills may 
have spent time with his family, either at home or at his hospital 
in Richmond. His letter dated July 23, 1863, his first since Get-
tysburg, told her not to worry, that he was in the hospital due to his 
“old complaint,” rheumatism.26 On August 18, 1863, at Chimbo-
razo Hospital, he wrote that he was feeling weak, had a bad feeling 
in his head, did not like the water, and that he desperately wanted to 
go home.27 The subsequent letter was dated December 28, 1863, at 
which point Wills seemed to be back in army life. A section of this 
letter hinted that he may have been home during his break; for in-
stance, he mentioned that a doctor asked him whether he had been 
home, and he told the doctor he had been.28 Wills did not include 
clues in any other of his letters, but if he truly went home while 
feeling unwell after Gettysburg, this furlough likely contributed 
to his continued service in the Confederate army. Time spent with 
his family would have been a welcome break from the service and 
could have refreshed him with renewed vigor for combat. Although 
it is a possibility that Wills’ time with his family was not approved 
by the military, this supposed desertion was only temporary and did 
not prevent his return to service.
Wills’ decision to remain in the army ultimately resulted 
in his death, as it did to so many other poor Virginia farmers like 
him. Nonetheless, Wills remained surprisingly optimistic through-
out the rest of his correspondence. Despite occasional disparaging 
comments such as “what good would the south do me after I am 
dead tho it may be the cause of my death yet” on February 12, 
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1864, he appeared to believe that he would not die during the war.29 
The source of his confidence was religion. If Wills had not been a 
devout Christian prior to his enlistment in the military, he certainly 
became one. Every single one of his letters devoted considerable 
space to religious thought, such as in a letter dated January 19, 
1864: “Well Mary I don’t think that god will let me be killed in this 
war. I want you to be a Christian I want you to do the will of god.”30 
He often spoke of attending revivals and frowned upon “wicked-
ness” in the army. Despite his lack of enthusiasm for the politics 
behind the war, he hoped that the war was for good and would make 
men give their hearts to the Lord.31 He regularly expressed confi-
dence that the Lord would keep him safe, but if not, he believed 
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the deciding factor in whether or not he deserted. It is difficult to as-
sume any form of religious affiliation affected desertion, consider-
ing strong religious devotion spread throughout both the Union and 
Confederate armies.33 Moreover, there is no reason to believe that 
the religious condition of the over 300,000 men recorded as desert-
ers during the war was significantly different than that of those who 
did not desert.34
 The more obvious motivation for his remaining in the army 
is that he felt he did not have a choice. The reason that many of his 
letters contained descriptions of the fates of deserters was likely 
because he was trying to explain to Mary how dangerous it would 
be for him to desert. While his early letters included descriptions of 
men effortlessly leaving the army or captured deserters in the guard 
house playing cards all day while “those who do right have the 
hardest time,” his later letters told of more serious consequences.35 
On June 26, 1863, Wills mentioned a deserter who was captured 
and shot, and in the same letter, he asked Mary not to write him 
anything she did not want others to see. On June 1, 1863, Mary had 
written that men were leaving the army in gangs, and home guards 
were trying to capture them but not having much success. She con-
cluded that there were few who blamed men for going home to 
their families, which was the most obvious request for his desertion 
in this collection of letters. Yet despite his common expressions of 
a desire to return home and sympathy for deserters, Wills’ letters 
often included harsh stories such as that on February 22, 1864: “last 
week there was a man shot in this brigade, I was excused that day 
and never saw him shot, the hole brigade went out that is was or-
dered out they said he fell dead he is out of this worlds misery and I 
hope is in heaven.”36 The 1st Virginia regimental diary contains nu-
merous similar descriptions of punishments for desertion, including 
months of hard labor and public whippings.37 Wills missed his fam-
ily terribly, but he appeared to be more willing to take his chances 
with the army than as a deserter.
 The 1st Virginia Infantry roster listed a total of 670 men 
absent or detached from service over its four-year existence, com-
pared to 87 killed in battle and 230 wounded. An average of 35 men 
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were absent from roll call every two months, yet Wills never joined 
that number.38 Wills’ case supports Ella Lonn’s work concerning 
desertion, as he did experience many of the same pressures to desert 
as she highlighted in her book. Yet his experience also provides an 
important contrast to Lonn’s work because Wills never did desert. 
His letters shed light on several of the chief reasons a poor Virginia 
farmer with little investment in the war would ultimately not desert: 
fear of the consequences and moral fortitude. However, the piv-
otal factor in his resolve not to desert may very well have been his 
visit to his family while injured. Plenty of other soldiers decided to 
risk the consequences and desert anyway, but Wills’ refreshing visit 
with his family coupled with his strong moral character strength-
ened his resolve to stay and fight. Indeed, his letters suggest that 
a taste of family could make all the difference between desertion 
and service. As such, by analyzing desertion through the eyes of 
an ordinary soldier, rather than solely through war records and of-
ficer reports as Lonn did, desertion becomes a much more complex 
issue. Did Wills’ regiment list him as a deserter, only to have him 
return and fight bravely to his death? Did Wills receive leave to be 
with his family as an incentive to keep him in the army? The in-
complete collection of letters between Charles and his wife raise as 
many questions as they answer, and only further studies concerning 
soldiers who received time with their families can confirm whether 
Wills’ story was common or exceptional. Wills was a single soldier, 
but the story of this poor farmer highlighted how desertion was a 
complex and personal decision that did not hinge on any one factor 
Lonn mentioned in her book, but instead on all of them combined. 
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Duffy Origins Of HatreD
origins of hatred:
The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in 
Fin-de-Siècle Vienna
At the turn of the twentieth century, imperial Vienna was 
commonly regarded as the cultural, economic, and political capi-
tal of East Central Europe. Under the control of Habsburg Em-
peror Franz Ferdinand, the city of two million boasted thriving 
intellectual and artistic communities, which produced thinkers 
and artists such as Sigmund Freud and Gustav Mahler. The per-
petuation of “high culture and archaic institutions” on a continent 
trending towards modernity has prompted some historians to la-
bel the city as “an anachronism.”1 Steeped in its traditional roots, 
Vienna possessed a thriving political scene dominated by Mayor 
Karl Lueger, a self-admitted anti-Semite, and the Austrian Chris-
tian Social Party. The prevalence of politics in the turn-of-the-
century city drew criticism from American author Mark Twain, 
who noted, “the atmosphere is brimful of political electricity 
[…] all conversation is political […] and out of this multitude of 
counsel you get merely confusion and despair.”2 Early twentieth 
century Viennese politics contained increasingly radical and anti-
Semitic aspects, which were influenced by the development of 
popular anti-Semitism within the city.
It was this traditional, yet radical political and social cli-
mate that prompted a young Adolf Hitler to note, “after the turn 
of the century, Vienna was, socially speaking, one of the most 
backward cities in Europe.”3 As a young man living in the impe-
rial capital, Hitler fell under the influence of “the man and move-
ment, which in those days guided Vienna’s destinies: Doctor Karl 
Lueger I and the Christian Social Party.”4 Lueger, a conservative 
Viennese mayor, is regarded by historians as one of Hitler’s early 
influences, primarily due to his use of energetic anti-Semitic polit-
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ical speeches. Nevertheless, Lueger’s devotion to anti-Semitism 
waxed and waned, prompting him to famously declare, “it is I 
who determine who is a Jew.”5 Anti-Semitism permeated through-
out the imperial city, significantly impacting the development of 
Austrian politics. However, what factors drove Karl Lueger, the 
Christian Social Party, and others to adopt a notion of political 
anti-Semitism that would influence the future of Viennese politics 
and the mind of a young Adolf Hitler?
This paper examines the social, political, and economic 
factors thought to contribute to the development of political anti-
Semitism in turn-of-the-century imperial Vienna. After exploring 
the history and evolution of anti-Semitism within the Habsburg 
Empire, the paper will focus on the increase of political anti-Se-
mitic thought and discourse within the capital. I will argue that 
the rise in political anti-Semitism at the end of the nineteenth 
century is attributed to the development and diffusion of popu-
lar anti-Semitism throughout the city. After analyzing the internal 
and external factors mentioned above, I will assert that economic 
factors had the most significant impact on the diffusion of popu-
lar anti-Semitism, mobilizing a large segment of the population 
and providing the necessary justification for the adoption of dis-
criminatory legislation. Finally, I will provide a brief overview of 
the ideologies and policies of Mayor Karl Lueger, a figure who 
characterizes the manifestations and ambiguities of Viennese an-
ti-Semitism.
While European political anti-Semitism dates back to 
the Roman Empire, anti-Semitism in Vienna and the Austrian 
Habsburg Empire arguably emerged during the twelfth century. 
Assessing the evolution of Viennese anti-Semitism, author Re-
becca Wiener notes, “Jews have a mixed history, […], raging from 
prosperity to persecution.”6 Crusaders, acting with the blessing of 
the pope, massacred Sholom, the first recorded Austrian Jew and 
smith for Duke Leopold V, along with other Jewish immigrants in 
1195.7 Additionally, King Rudolf I von Habsburg seized control 
of Jewish property through the Mandate on Property of Fleeing 
Jews (1268), which declares that the state will “take […] into our 
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hands” all Jewish “possessions, belongings, and movable and im-
movable property.”8 However, religious persecution of Jews by 
Christians was common in Europe at this time. While anti-Sem-
itism and Jewish persecution continued throughout the medieval 
period, it dissipated in Vienna, which “was one of the few cities 
that did not blame the Jews for causing [the Black Death].”9 Po-
litical anti-Semitism appeared throughout early modern Austria; 
however, its manifestation in political decrees was primarily reli-
giously motivated, with the Catholic Church endorsing violence 
and policies against Jews.
Until the late nineteenth century, Viennese Jews expe-
rienced several centuries of relative success, gaining signifi-
cant standing and influence within the city’s culture. The liberal 
policies of Emperor Joseph II, including the Edict of Toleration 
(1781), relaxed, but did not eliminate, some of the regulations 
passed by Empress Maria Theresa, a strict anti-Semite. Toler-
ant policies drew a wave of Jewish immigrants to Vienna, bring-
ing a surge of professionals and intellectuals to the city, such as 
Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler.10 Arguably, the rise in modern 
political anti-Semitic discourse coincided with a social, political, 
and economic backlash against Jewish intellectual and fiscal suc-
cess in the capital. As historian Bruce F. Pauley notes, modern 
political anti-Semitism “was no longer simply an emotion or reli-
gious prejudice […] but was now a political program and a justi-
fication for political action.”11 Developed politically under Mayor 
Karl Lueger and the Christian Social Party, the popular Viennese 
anti-Semitic movement drew its motivation from a series of so-
cial, political, and economic factors.
Social backlash against Jewish intellectual and economic 
success contributed to the development of political anti-Semitism. 
Circulated through an increasingly radical and anti-Semitic press, 
social anti-Semitism manifested itself through intellectual, racial, 
and nationalistic discrimination. However, social and political 
anti-Semitism was neither as violent nor as prominent as that un-
der the Third Reich. As Boyer notes, “the prewar Gentile might 
approach the Jewish community […] with hostility, but also with 
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a grudging respect for their energy, industry, and general stabil-
ity.”12 In fact, at the turn of the century, Jewish scholars accounted 
for a third of all university students in Vienna.13 Nonetheless, Jew-
ish intellectual success would serve as both a boon and a curse for 
the community. In the year 1875, Theodor Billroth, a prominent 
surgeon, incited an intellectual uprising against Jewish university 
students.14 Student groups, such as the Leserverein der deutscen 
studenten, adopted increasingly nationalistic and racialist poli-
cies, leading to increased prejudice against Jewish academics.15 
The rise in intellectual Jewish discrimination can be attributed 
to increasingly nationalistic aspirations as well as to feelings of 
inadequacy amongst the Viennese population. Additionally, such 
emotions contributed to the development of racial anti-Semitic 
notions, influencing the overall creation of social anti-Semitism.
Intellectual discrimination was marginally tied into over-
arching notions of racial prejudice and social anti-Semitism, 
which were disseminated throughout the city by a radical political 
press. However, as noted by Boyer, “racialism as the most ex-
treme form of anti-Semitism was rarely to be found in Vienna.”16 
In fact, the radical Viennese press was limited to “a subculture 
of crackpot journalists […] located on the fringes of the power 
structure.”17 At the time, notions of biological differences and su-
periority remained nonexistent or confined to a small segment of 
the population. Additionally, the radical press remained continu-
ally in opposition to the domination of the liberal press, which 
was managed by Jewish owners and journalists. The prominence 
of the Jewish-dominated press prompted the nationalistic anti-
Semite George von Schoenerer to sarcastically claim: “Long live 
our allies, the corruptible and Judaised Viennese press!”18 Nev-
ertheless, the presence of minute levels of racial anti-Semitism 
contributed to the formation of another marginalized movement: 
nationalistic anti-Semitism.
Notions of racial anti-Semitism were associated with 
growing nationalistic movements, which viewed Jews as mem-
bers of another nationality and therefore unsuitable for incorpora-
tion into a pan-German state. Yet, liberal nationalist factions ini-
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tially drew Jewish supporters. The origins of popular racial and 
national anti-Semitism emerged under the influence of George 
von Schoenerer, who targeted intellectual and economic activities 
to foster nationalistic anti-Semitic movements.19 The Linz Pro-
gramme, which demanded “the removal of Jewish influence from 
all sections of public life,” exhibits Schoenerer’s nationalistic as-
pirations; however, the program ultimately failed due to its radical 
anti-Semitic policies.20 Nevertheless, the combination of national-
istic and racial anti-Semitism, two fringe movements, mobilized a 
small, but significant factor of Vienna’s population.
While social anti-Semitism contributed to the develop-
ment of popular anti-Semitism through the mobilization of intel-
lectual, racial, and nationalistic movements, political alterations 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century provided the 
means through which Jewish residents could receive legislative 
representation. However, an increasingly conservative political 
atmosphere, a product of the decline of liberalism within the Em-
pire, also fostered the development of popular and political anti-
Semitism. The turn of the nineteenth century brought the Jewish 
community several opportunities for legislative advancement. For 
example, the Austrian Constitution of 1867 decreed:
Article 1. For all natives of the various kingdoms and 
countries represented in the Reichsrat there exists a com-
mon right of Austrian citizenship. The law shall determine 
under what conditions Austrian citizenship is gained, ex-
ercised, and lost. Article 2. All citizens are equal before 
the law. Article 3. Public offices shall be equally open to 
all citizens. The admission of foreigners to public office is 
dependent upon their acquisition of Austrian citizenship.21
The obtainment of citizenship and the ability of Jews to run for 
public office altered Austria’s political system, which had tradi-
tionally excluded minorities. Additionally, Jewish political par-
ticipation may have shocked the country’s elite classes, inciting a 
backlash of anti-Semitic discourse and propaganda. Political car-
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toons from the period indicate a growing division within Austrian 
politics: the split between the Christian Social and Social Demo-
crat Parties.22 With Emperor Franz Joseph’s passage of universal 
male suffrage in 1908, Austrian Jewish males gained full access to 
the country’s political sphere. The entrance of Jews into the Aus-
trian political system accounts for the rise in political opposition 
to the Christian Social Party as well as the increase in anti-Semitic 
discourse.
Additionally, the conservative nature of Vienna’s politics 
crafted a favorable environment for political and popular anti-
Semitic dialogue. Despite church decline throughout Europe, the 
Catholic Church remained an influential figure within Viennese 
and Austrian politics. Like the contradictory nature of Viennese 
anti-Semitism, the church would identify “first with Jews and 
then hold the Jews responsible for them.”23 Anti-Semitism dif-
fused from the church and infiltrated Vienna’s political system, 
especially under the term of Mayor Karl Lueger. Catholic priests, 
working as “priest-journalists,” contributed to the anti-Semitic 
press, speaking “at anti-Semitic public rallies” and authoring 
“numerous anti-Jewish tracts.”24 The increase in Jewish political 
participation only furthered the reactionary and anti-Semitic na-
ture of the conservative movement, which sought to perpetuate its 
power in government.
Despite the impact of social and political factors, a series 
of economic changes in Austria arguably had the most significant 
effect on the rise of popular anti-Semitism. While the passage of 
new legislation and the dominance of conservative politics pro-
vided the essential foundations for the development of popular 
anti-Semitism, the economic depression of the early nineteenth 
century, the decline of Viennese artisans, allegations of Judaic 
fraud and laziness, and fears of economic competition contrib-
uted the necessary economic incentives to undertake popular and 
political anti-Semitic discourse. Unlike the preceding social and 
political factors, economic anti-Semitism mobilized Viennese in-
dustrial workers and white-collar businessmen, who comprised 
a significant percentage of the city’s population. According to a 
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1900 census, there were 140,655 independent businessmen and 
430,865 full-time workers in Vienna, comprising one-fourth of 
the city’s population of two million.25 Besides providing justifica-
tion for anti-Semitism, the incorporation of the working class pro-
vided a large, supportive base for the movement’s advancement.
The notion of the Jewish population as the “eternal scape-
goat” factored into the justification and blame for the 1873 eco-
nomic depression.26 The economic crash, incited by rapid German 
industrialization and lax economic policies, primarily harmed lo-
cal artisans and small investors.27 The stock market crash also 
brought Europe and North America into a period of economic 
depression, thereby stalling European production and global mar-
kets. In the misery following the crash, “simple explanations, 
scapegoats [the Jews] were welcome.”28 However, the economic 
slump of the 1870s contributed more to the decline of liberal poli-
tics than it did to the rise of anti-Semitism in Austria. In neigh-
boring Germany, anti-Semitic discourse resonated throughout the 
population, constructing the foundations for future political ac-
tion and opposition.
By the late nineteenth century, Viennese artisans had ex-
perienced a significant financial decline. The effects of European 
industrialization and the 1873 depression impacted the artisan 
workforce, leading to a decreased production demand, and, there-
fore, decreased annual income. Food price inflation during the 
1880s resulted in “the first stages of political anti-Semitism in Vi-
enna.”29 Although not economically poor, an increase in the cost of 
living combined with a decrease in production quotas placed ad-
ditional financial stress on the struggling artisans. Consequently, 
to combat economic stressors, the artisan movement adopted the 
use of political anti-Semitism. In this situation, artisans utilized 
existing federal structures to form “the anti-Semitic City Council 
delegation” and “anti-Semitic political clubs.”30 Working within 
the political structure, such organizations lobbied in favor of guild 
and industry protectionism. Arguably, the financial decline of the 
artisan workforce mandated the use of new political tactics, like 
anti-Semitism, to ensure their economic survival.
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In an economically struggling society, Jewish shop own-
ers, craftsmen, and professionals provided unwanted fiscal chal-
lenges. However, as Boyer notes, economic and social interaction 
initially tied the populations of Vienna “together in a thousand 
informal ways.”31 Under the capitalist system, economic competi-
tion fostered financial development, providing artisan industries 
with opportunities for growth and expansion. With increased eco-
nomic challenges and the admission of Jews into the public ser-
vice, “anti-Semitism found enormous support among thousands 
of Gentile employees, who competed with their Jewish colleagues 
for appointments, promotions, salary raises, and positions in insti-
tutions.”32 The prospect of job competition did not resonate well 
with the non-Jewish community, which already faced increased 
financial pressure. Although some private businesses banned Jews 
from its advisory and executive boards, a notion of anti-Semitism 
permeated throughout working-class Viennese society.33
Traditional allegations of Judaic fraud and laziness com-
prised the Viennese artisan and working classes’ justifications for 
economic anti-Semitism. Crime statistics from imperial Vienna 
indicate, “Jews generally suffered a higher rate of convictions for 
misdemeanors in financial affairs.”34 The relative prosperity of the 
Jews compared to the Gentile working class prompted Robert Pat-
tai, a lawyer, to link Jewish economic success to the fabled “Jew-
ish question”:
If we now see that today the Jews have, under the rule of 
their theories, risen to almost a hegemony in the econom-
ic sphere, then from this loftier point of view the Jewish 
question appears as but a symptom of general economic 
disease. Should it not be possible to cut the root of the 
Jewish question through these necessary reforms, then the 
discriminatory laws, […] demanded from so many sides, 
will become necessary.35
Although such speeches attempt to justify political anti-Semitism, 
they reveal the Viennese population’s inherent jealousy of Jewish 
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economic success. Additionally, turn of the century Vienna resi-
dents drew upon historical notions of fabled Jewish laziness. Such 
actions ultimately reveal a poor attempt to justify an increasingly 
hostile anti-Semitic attitude that would culminate following the 
First World War.
Consequently, the economic situation in imperial Vienna 
provided the necessary justification and means to achieve popular 
and political anti-Semitism. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
popular anti-Semitism resonated throughout the city, appearing 
in the conservative press as well as political and intellectual dis-
course. Arguably, the combination of social, political, and eco-
nomic factors allowed for the development and diffusion of popu-
lar anti-Semitism throughout all sectors and social strata of the 
city’s population. With the political and public sphere mobilized 
and supportive of anti-Semitism, the city’s leaders, under the con-
trol of the Christian Social Party, could achieve the passage of 
anti-Semitic policies and legislation without major opposition.
The intricate origins of Jewish anti-Semitism in Vienna 
ultimately resulted in the election of Karl Lueger, a self-admitted 
anti-Semite and leader of the Austrian Christian Social Party, in 
1897. Lueger’s electoral victory represented a triumph for the 
church and the conservative party as well as for proponents of 
Jewish discrimination. However, his victory and use of fervent 
anti-Semitism drew concern from Emperor Franz Joseph, who ex-
pressed his reservations in an 1895 letter:
The day before yesterday I received the enclosed letter 
from Valier as well as the additionally enclosed letters of 
old princess Arenberg […] in which Lueger and his party 
were most warmly recommended to me. Anti-Semitism is 
an uncommonly wide-spread sickness that has penetrated 
into the highest circles and the agitation is unbelievable. 
The core is actually good, but the excesses are terrible.36
In fact, Franz Joseph would oppose Lueger’s ascent to office, only 
accepting his victory following public outcry. The letter also re-
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veals the diffusion of anti-Semitism throughout the social strata 
of Austrian society. By the time Lueger assumed power in 1897, 
“many Jewish occupation groups found themselves disadvantaged 
and ‘left out’ of the local political system,” thereby demonstrating 
the influence of anti-Semitic policies.37
Under Lueger, anti-Semitism would flourish, yet the man 
himself would never become a “true anti-Semite.”38 In fact, popu-
lar legend recounts how Lueger entertained and interacted with 
Jewish acquaintances. The ambiguous nature of Lueger’s person-
al anti-Semitic beliefs reveals the contradictory nature of Vien-
nese anti-Semitism. Lueger was a man of opportunity, utilizing 
political anti-Semitism to maintain popular and political power. 
Author John W. Boyer supports this point, noting Lueger knew 
power “did not follow neat ethnic lines,” and therefore spent time 
“cultivating the wealthy and influential.”39 The ideology of anti-
Semitism among the masses may have contained more radical 
aspects, as demonstrated by the presence of social anti-Semitist 
factors, including intellectual, racial, and nationalistic anti-Semi-
tism. Additionally, Lueger, in a position of power, was not likely 
to be economically threatened by the influx of Jewish workers. 
However, his most significant challenge would be posed by the 
Social Democratic party, which was comprised primarily of Jew-
ish politicians.
The progression of political anti-Semitism in imperial Vi-
enna stemmed from an increase in popular anti-Semitism, which 
was influenced by a variety of social, political, and economic fac-
tors. Social factors, including the development of intellectual, ra-
cial, and nationalistic discrimination, incorporated a fringe, yet 
radical section of Viennese society into the mainstream anti-Se-
mitic movement. The enfranchisement and incorporation of Jews 
into the political system posed a direct threat to the perpetuation 
of Christian power, prompting Viennese leaders to exclude Jews 
from political and civil processes. The city’s politically charged 
atmosphere created the necessary conditions for the expansion of 
anti-Semitism. However, the economic depression of 1873, the 
decline of Viennese artisans, the threat of competition from Jew-
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lar legend recounts how Lueger entertained and interacted with 
Jewish acquaintances. The ambiguous nature of Lueger’s person-
al anti-Semitic beliefs reveals the contradictory nature of Vien-
nese anti-Semitism. Lueger was a man of opportunity, utilizing 
political anti-Semitism to maintain popular and political power. 
Author John W. Boyer supports this point, noting Lueger knew 
power “did not follow neat ethnic lines,” and therefore spent time 
“cultivating the wealthy and influential.”39 The ideology of anti-
Semitism among the masses may have contained more radical 
aspects, as demonstrated by the presence of social anti-Semitist 
factors, including intellectual, racial, and nationalistic anti-Semi-
tism. Additionally, Lueger, in a position of power, was not likely 
to be economically threatened by the influx of Jewish workers. 
However, his most significant challenge would be posed by the 
Social Democratic party, which was comprised primarily of Jew-
ish politicians.
The progression of political anti-Semitism in imperial Vi-
enna stemmed from an increase in popular anti-Semitism, which 
was influenced by a variety of social, political, and economic fac-
tors. Social factors, including the development of intellectual, ra-
cial, and nationalistic discrimination, incorporated a fringe, yet 
radical section of Viennese society into the mainstream anti-Se-
mitic movement. The enfranchisement and incorporation of Jews 
into the political system posed a direct threat to the perpetuation 
of Christian power, prompting Viennese leaders to exclude Jews 
from political and civil processes. The city’s politically charged 
atmosphere created the necessary conditions for the expansion of 
anti-Semitism. However, the economic depression of 1873, the 
decline of Viennese artisans, the threat of competition from Jew-
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ish tradesmen and workers resulted in the diffusion of traditional 
economic anti-Semitic accusations, including allegations of fraud 
and laziness. Arguably, these economic factors resulted in the mo-
bilization of the working and middle class Viennese communities 
as well as provided the necessary justification to instigate political 
anti-Semitism. The election of Mayor Karl Lueger, an admitted, 
yet questionable anti-Semite reflects the achievements and con-
cerns of the Viennese anti-Semitic movement. Ultimately, these 
origins of imperial Viennese discrimination and anti-Semitism 
laid the foundations for the development of Nazi ideology.
33 Duffy Origins Of HatreD
ish tradesmen and workers resulted in the diffusion of traditional 
economic anti-Semitic accusations, including allegations of fraud 
and laziness. Arguably, these economic factors resulted in the mo-
bilization of the working and middle class Viennese communities 
as well as provided the necessary justification to instigate political 
anti-Semitism. The election of Mayor Karl Lueger, an admitted, 
yet questionable anti-Semite reflects the achievements and con-
cerns of the Viennese anti-Semitic movement. Ultimately, these 
origins of imperial Viennese discrimination and anti-Semitism 
laid the foundations for the development of Nazi ideology.
33
Duffy Origins Of HatreD
ish tradesmen and workers resulted in the diffusion of traditional 
economic anti-Semitic accusations, including allegations of fraud 
and laziness. Arguably, these economic factors resulted in the mo-
bilization of the working and middle class Viennese communities 
as well as provided the necessary justification to instigate political 
anti-Semitism. The election of Mayor Karl Lueger, an admitted, 
yet questionable anti-Semite reflects the achievements and con-
cerns of the Viennese anti-Semitic movement. Ultimately, these 
origins of imperial Viennese discrimination and anti-Semitism 
laid the foundations for the development of Nazi ideology.
33 Duffy Origins Of HatreD
ish tradesmen and workers resulted in the diffusion of traditional 
economic anti-Semitic accusations, including allegations of fraud 
and laziness. Arguably, these economic factors resulted in the mo-
bilization of the working and middle class Viennese communities 
as well as provided the necessary justification to instigate political 
anti-Semitism. The election of Mayor Karl Lueger, an admitted, 
yet questionable anti-Semite reflects the achievements and con-
cerns of the Viennese anti-Semitic movement. Ultimately, these 
origins of imperial Viennese discrimination and anti-Semitism 
laid the foundations for the development of Nazi ideology.
33
Spring 2012JameS Blair HiStorical review
Endnotes
1 C. E. Shorske, “Fin-de-Siècle Vienna,” http://www.math.chalmers.se/~ulfp/
Review/schorske.pdf.
2 Mark Twain, “Stirring Times in Austria,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 
96 (1898): 30-40.
3 “Adolf Hitler: The Discovery of Antisemitism in Vienna,” HNet, Humanities 
and Social Sciences Online, http://www.h-net.org/~german/gtext/kaiserreich/
hitler1.html.
4 Ibid., n.pag.
5 John W. Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” The Leo Baeck Insti-
tute Yearbook 26, no.1 (1981): 128.
6 Rebecca Weiner, “The Virtual Jewish History Tour – Vienna,” Jewish Virtual
Library, American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, http://www.jewishvirtual-
library.org/jsource/vjw/Vienna.html.
7 Samuel Kurinsky, “Gold and Silver Smithing; A Judaic Tradition,” Hebrew 
History Foundation, http://www.hebrewhistory.info/factpapers/fp017-2_gold.
htm.
8 King Rudolf I von Habsburg, “Mandate on Property of Fleeing Jews, 6 
December 1286,” History of Austria: Primary Documents, Brigham Young 
University, http://user.cs.tu-berlin.de/~ohherde/rudolf1.htm.
9 Weiner, “Virtual Jewish History Tour – Vienna,” n.pag.
10 Ibid., n.pag.
11 Bruce F. Pauley, From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-
Semitism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 27.
12 John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of 
the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), 73.
13 Brigitte Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna: A Dictator’s Apprenticeship (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 327.
14 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 89.
15 Ibid., 89
16 Ibid., 78.
17 Ibid., 78.
18 Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Aus-
tria (New York: Wiley, 1964), 147.
19 Robert S. Wistrich, “Socialism and Anti-Semitism in Austria before 1914,” 
Jewish Social Studies 37, no. ¾ (1975): 323.
20 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 147.
21 “Fundamental Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens,” HNet, 
Humanities and Social Sciences Online, https://www.h-net.org/~habsweb/
sourcetexts/auscon.htm.
22 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 179.
34Spring 2012JameS Blair HiStorical review
Endnotes
1 C. E. Shorske, “Fin-de-Siècle Vienna,” http://www.math.chalmers.se/~ulfp/
Review/schorske.pdf.
2 Mark Twain, “Stirring Times in Austria,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 
96 (1898): 30-40.
3 “Adolf Hitler: The Discovery of Antisemitism in Vienna,” HNet, Humanities 
and Social Sciences Online, http://www.h-net.org/~german/gtext/kaiserreich/
hitler1.html.
4 Ibid., n.pag.
5 John W. Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” The Leo Baeck Insti-
tute Yearbook 26, no.1 (1981): 128.
6 Rebecca Weiner, “The Virtual Jewish History Tour – Vienna,” Jewish Virtual
Library, American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, http://www.jewishvirtual-
library.org/jsource/vjw/Vienna.html.
7 Samuel Kurinsky, “Gold and Silver Smithing; A Judaic Tradition,” Hebrew 
History Foundation, http://www.hebrewhistory.info/factpapers/fp017-2_gold.
htm.
8 King Rudolf I von Habsburg, “Mandate on Property of Fleeing Jews, 6 
December 1286,” History of Austria: Primary Documents, Brigham Young 
University, http://user.cs.tu-berlin.de/~ohherde/rudolf1.htm.
9 Weiner, “Virtual Jewish History Tour – Vienna,” n.pag.
10 Ibid., n.pag.
11 Bruce F. Pauley, From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-
Semitism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 27.
12 John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of 
the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), 73.
13 Brigitte Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna: A Dictator’s Apprenticeship (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 327.
14 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 89.
15 Ibid., 89
16 Ibid., 78.
17 Ibid., 78.
18 Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Aus-
tria (New York: Wiley, 1964), 147.
19 Robert S. Wistrich, “Socialism and Anti-Semitism in Austria before 1914,” 
Jewish Social Studies 37, no. ¾ (1975): 323.
20 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 147.
21 “Fundamental Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens,” HNet, 
Humanities and Social Sciences Online, https://www.h-net.org/~habsweb/
sourcetexts/auscon.htm.
22 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 179.
34
Spring 2012JameS Blair HiStorical review
Endnotes
1 C. E. Shorske, “Fin-de-Siècle Vienna,” http://www.math.chalmers.se/~ulfp/
Review/schorske.pdf.
2 Mark Twain, “Stirring Times in Austria,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 
96 (1898): 30-40.
3 “Adolf Hitler: The Discovery of Antisemitism in Vienna,” HNet, Humanities 
and Social Sciences Online, http://www.h-net.org/~german/gtext/kaiserreich/
hitler1.html.
4 Ibid., n.pag.
5 John W. Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” The Leo Baeck Insti-
tute Yearbook 26, no.1 (1981): 128.
6 Rebecca Weiner, “The Virtual Jewish History Tour – Vienna,” Jewish Virtual
Library, American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, http://www.jewishvirtual-
library.org/jsource/vjw/Vienna.html.
7 Samuel Kurinsky, “Gold and Silver Smithing; A Judaic Tradition,” Hebrew 
History Foundation, http://www.hebrewhistory.info/factpapers/fp017-2_gold.
htm.
8 King Rudolf I von Habsburg, “Mandate on Property of Fleeing Jews, 6 
December 1286,” History of Austria: Primary Documents, Brigham Young 
University, http://user.cs.tu-berlin.de/~ohherde/rudolf1.htm.
9 Weiner, “Virtual Jewish History Tour – Vienna,” n.pag.
10 Ibid., n.pag.
11 Bruce F. Pauley, From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-
Semitism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 27.
12 John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of 
the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), 73.
13 Brigitte Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna: A Dictator’s Apprenticeship (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 327.
14 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 89.
15 Ibid., 89
16 Ibid., 78.
17 Ibid., 78.
18 Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Aus-
tria (New York: Wiley, 1964), 147.
19 Robert S. Wistrich, “Socialism and Anti-Semitism in Austria before 1914,” 
Jewish Social Studies 37, no. ¾ (1975): 323.
20 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 147.
21 “Fundamental Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens,” HNet, 
Humanities and Social Sciences Online, https://www.h-net.org/~habsweb/
sourcetexts/auscon.htm.
22 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 179.
34Spring 2012JameS Blair HiStorical review
Endnotes
1 C. E. Shorske, “Fin-de-Siècle Vienna,” http://www.math.chalmers.se/~ulfp/
Review/schorske.pdf.
2 Mark Twain, “Stirring Times in Austria,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 
96 (1898): 30-40.
3 “Adolf Hitler: The Discovery of Antisemitism in Vienna,” HNet, Humanities 
and Social Sciences Online, http://www.h-net.org/~german/gtext/kaiserreich/
hitler1.html.
4 Ibid., n.pag.
5 John W. Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” The Leo Baeck Insti-
tute Yearbook 26, no.1 (1981): 128.
6 Rebecca Weiner, “The Virtual Jewish History Tour – Vienna,” Jewish Virtual
Library, American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, http://www.jewishvirtual-
library.org/jsource/vjw/Vienna.html.
7 Samuel Kurinsky, “Gold and Silver Smithing; A Judaic Tradition,” Hebrew 
History Foundation, http://www.hebrewhistory.info/factpapers/fp017-2_gold.
htm.
8 King Rudolf I von Habsburg, “Mandate on Property of Fleeing Jews, 6 
December 1286,” History of Austria: Primary Documents, Brigham Young 
University, http://user.cs.tu-berlin.de/~ohherde/rudolf1.htm.
9 Weiner, “Virtual Jewish History Tour – Vienna,” n.pag.
10 Ibid., n.pag.
11 Bruce F. Pauley, From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-
Semitism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 27.
12 John W. Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of 
the Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), 73.
13 Brigitte Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna: A Dictator’s Apprenticeship (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 327.
14 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 89.
15 Ibid., 89
16 Ibid., 78.
17 Ibid., 78.
18 Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Aus-
tria (New York: Wiley, 1964), 147.
19 Robert S. Wistrich, “Socialism and Anti-Semitism in Austria before 1914,” 
Jewish Social Studies 37, no. ¾ (1975): 323.
20 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 147.
21 “Fundamental Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens,” HNet, 
Humanities and Social Sciences Online, https://www.h-net.org/~habsweb/
sourcetexts/auscon.htm.
22 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 179.
34
Duffy Origins Of HatreD
23 Pauley, From Prejudice to Persecution, 39.
24 Ibid., 40.
25 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 68.
26 Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), 247.
27 Ibid., 281.
28 Ritchie Robertson, The Jewish Question in German Literature, 1749-1939 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), quoted in Edward F. Kravitt, 
“Mahler, Victim of the New Anti-Semitism,” Journal of the Royal Music As-
sociation 127, no. 1 (2002): 77.
29 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 58.
30 Ibid., 70-71.
31 Ibid., 75.
32 Ibid., 84.
33 Ibid., 84.
34 Ibid., 80.
35 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 140.
36 Richard S. Geehr, Karl Lueger: Mayor of Fin de Siècle Vienna (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1990), 92.
37 Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” 125.
38 Geehr, Karl Lueger, 14.
39 Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” 126.
35 Duffy Origins Of HatreD
23 Pauley, From Prejudice to Persecution, 39.
24 Ibid., 40.
25 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 68.
26 Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), 247.
27 Ibid., 281.
28 Ritchie Robertson, The Jewish Question in German Literature, 1749-1939 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), quoted in Edward F. Kravitt, 
“Mahler, Victim of the New Anti-Semitism,” Journal of the Royal Music As-
sociation 127, no. 1 (2002): 77.
29 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 58.
30 Ibid., 70-71.
31 Ibid., 75.
32 Ibid., 84.
33 Ibid., 84.
34 Ibid., 80.
35 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 140.
36 Richard S. Geehr, Karl Lueger: Mayor of Fin de Siècle Vienna (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1990), 92.
37 Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” 125.
38 Geehr, Karl Lueger, 14.
39 Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” 126.
35
Duffy Origins Of HatreD
23 Pauley, From Prejudice to Persecution, 39.
24 Ibid., 40.
25 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 68.
26 Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), 247.
27 Ibid., 281.
28 Ritchie Robertson, The Jewish Question in German Literature, 1749-1939 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), quoted in Edward F. Kravitt, 
“Mahler, Victim of the New Anti-Semitism,” Journal of the Royal Music As-
sociation 127, no. 1 (2002): 77.
29 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 58.
30 Ibid., 70-71.
31 Ibid., 75.
32 Ibid., 84.
33 Ibid., 84.
34 Ibid., 80.
35 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 140.
36 Richard S. Geehr, Karl Lueger: Mayor of Fin de Siècle Vienna (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1990), 92.
37 Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” 125.
38 Geehr, Karl Lueger, 14.
39 Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” 126.
35 Duffy Origins Of HatreD
23 Pauley, From Prejudice to Persecution, 39.
24 Ibid., 40.
25 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 68.
26 Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), 247.
27 Ibid., 281.
28 Ritchie Robertson, The Jewish Question in German Literature, 1749-1939 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), quoted in Edward F. Kravitt, 
“Mahler, Victim of the New Anti-Semitism,” Journal of the Royal Music As-
sociation 127, no. 1 (2002): 77.
29 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 58.
30 Ibid., 70-71.
31 Ibid., 75.
32 Ibid., 84.
33 Ibid., 84.
34 Ibid., 80.
35 Pulzer, Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 140.
36 Richard S. Geehr, Karl Lueger: Mayor of Fin de Siècle Vienna (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1990), 92.
37 Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” 125.
38 Geehr, Karl Lueger, 14.
39 Boyer, “Karl Lueger and the Viennese Jews,” 126.
35
Hurley And Judgment BelongetH to god Alone 
and Judgment belongeth to god alone:
 Al-Jabarti’s Chronicle of Napoleonic Egypt
 On July 1, 1798, in the opening salvo of the young and 
ambitious Napoleon Bonaparte’s first independent war of con-
quest, thousands of French troops disembarked from an armada 
assembled off the coast of Egypt. By noon the next day, Napoleon 
had conquered the ancient port of Alexandria, and after defeating 
the Mamluks at Shubrakhit and the Battle of the Pyramids, he 
took Cairo on July 21, establishing a French regime that would 
last until General Jacques-François Menou’s surrender to the Brit-
ish in 1802.1 Napoleon’s presence in Egypt would ultimately have 
a number of lasting repercussions, including the destruction of the 
ruling Mamluk class, the eviction of Ottoman rule, and the estab-
lishment of the Muhammad Ali dynasty, which would continue 
to reign until 1952.2 As a result, the Napoleonic invasion is often 
seen as the opening act of Egypt’s modern era.3
 In addition to serving as the catalyst for Middle Eastern 
modernity, Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign marked the first di-
rect meeting of post-revolutionary Europe and the Arab world.4 
Although the Ottoman Empire had been in contact with Europe 
for centuries, and “even at the time of the invasion fifty or sixty 
French merchants resided in Egypt,” the majority of Egyptians 
“had only the most rudimentary knowledge of European affairs.”5 
The French occupation of Egypt produced “shocking revelations” 
about the military expertise of France’s modern army, the orga-
nization and effectiveness of her bureaucratic systems, and the 
intellectual capabilities of the team of scholars who had accom-
panied the expedition.6 Although Middle East scholar Thomas 
Philipp argues that the Napoleonic invasion was not an effective 
means of transmitting the ideas of the Enlightenment and French 
Revolution, the introduction of the imperialist and atheist French 
into the conservative and predominantly Muslim Egyptian society 
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nevertheless led to a cultural collision.7
 Despite the large quantity of memoirs and observations 
available from French officers and scholars, the Arab response of 
the French occupation is principally, and almost exclusively, dem-
onstrated in the writings of one man, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti. 
A prominent Muslim scholar and member of the ‘ulama’, al-Jab-
arti chronicled the important events and his personal experience 
of the French occupation in three important works that provide 
a uniquely valuable account of the “encounter of an expanding 
modern Europe with non-European traditional societies as seen 
from a non-European perspective.”8 The first of al-Jabarti’s ac-
counts, the Ta’rikh Muddat al-Faransis bi Misr min Sanat 1213 ila 
Sanat 1216, describes the period ranging from June to December 
of 1798, beginning with the arrival of Admiral Nelson in search 
of the French fleet and concluding with Napoleon’s continuing 
attempts to secure his rule in Egypt.9 Although the Muddat al-
Faransis was “written under the trauma of an occupation which, 
for all Jabarti knew, was to become a permanent one,” it never-
theless presents al-Jabarti’s unabashed criticisms of the atrocities 
committed by the French in the course of their occupation as well 
as his emotional reactions to the conquerors themselves.10 At the 
same time, however, his scholarly respect for the French is appar-
ent in his descriptions of his visits to the newly founded Institut de 
l’Egypte.11
 As mentioned, the Muddat al-Faransis opens with a 
description of the British fleet off the coast of Alexandria. Nel-
son’s fleet dispatches a delegation to warn the Egyptians that “the 
French had set out from their country with a great fleet…perhaps 
they will attack you suddenly and you will not be able to repel 
them.”12 Although the British are under orders to “take, sink, burn 
or destroy” the French, the Egyptians refuse their offer of assis-
tance, and the British depart.13 Ten days later, the French arrive 
and easily overwhelm Alexandria’s defenses, since “not only did 
[the Egyptians] not pay sufficient attention to the port but even re-
moved what weapons and cannons were already there” out of fear 
that they might be used to rebel against the sultan, an oversight of 
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which al-Jabarti is sharply critical.14 While he is also critical of the 
Egyptian’s decision to send to the Ottoman Sultan for aid, al-Jab-
arti’s opinion of the French remains largely neutral and restricted 
to a factual account of their seizure of the city and imposition of 
taxes to fund their army.15
 This level of objectivity and detachment in the chroni-
cler’s description of the French vanishes as soon as the French 
issue a proclamation in Arabic full of “inducements, warnings, 
[and] all manner of wiliness and stipulations.”16 Al-Jabarti re-
prints the three-page proclamation in full before devoting six 
pages to detailing the dishonesty of the French and noting every 
single stylistic or grammatical error their deceitful announcement 
contains.17 This may seem excessive, however, “no one writes 
about the occupation of his country with any degree of tolerance 
or fondness,” and as a well-educated ‘alim al-Jabarti would take 
pride in his mastery of the Arabic language.18 Furthermore, by 
discrediting the French occupiers’ Arabic ability al-Jabarti further 
alienates them from the Egyptians over whom they rule and also 
provides further reason not to believe their claims to be Muslim, 
as Arabic is the only official language of the Qur’an.
 Despite al-Jabarti’s criticisms, the French proclamation 
provides valuable evidence of the French attempt to win the sup-
port of the Egyptian people by justifying their campaign. The 
French claim that their invasion is the result of mistreatment of 
the French community by the Mamluks, in the course of end-
ing which they also seek to liberate the Egyptians from Mamluk 
rule.19 In order to validate replacing the Mamluks as rulers, the 
French describe themselves as allies of the Sultan and offer their 
conquest of Rome, home of the Vatican, and the island of Malta, 
which was ruled by a Catholic order “who claimed that God the 
Exalted required them to fight the Muslims,” as evidence that they 
are fellow devotees of Islam.20 The proclamation was initially 
successful, leading “most of the rural population and fellahin” to 
believe that the “the French were accompanied by Pashas sent by 
the Sultan.”21 Nevertheless, al-Jabarti himself was not deceived; 
he correctly interprets the French’s Islamic gestures as indicat-
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ing that “they do not agree…with any religion” and concludes 
his commentary on the French proclamation by requesting that 
God “hurry misfortune and punishment upon them…scatter their 
hosts, and disperse them.”22
 Al-Jabarti’s curse seems to have gone unheard as he next 
describes Napoleon’s defeat of the Mamluks at Shubrakhit and 
the Battle of the Pyramids and the ensuing conquest of Cairo. He 
describes the Mamluk army as characterized by pride, disorder, 
and cowardice, and states that it “altogether disappointed what-
ever hopes had been placed in it and brought upon themselves 
both the fires of Hell and disgrace.”23 Toward the French army, 
on the other hand, he is openly complimentary, even stating that 
Napoleon’s soldiers “acted as if they were following the tradi-
tion of the Community (of Muhammad) in early Islam and saw 
themselves as fighters in a holy war.”24 Although these comments 
are unusual, if not downright treasonous, al-Jabarti’s prestige and 
wealth as a leading ‘alim meant that he “never had to ingratiate 
himself with anyone…and thus could be as critical and as dis-
dainful in his writings as he pleased,” both toward the French and 
toward the Mamluks, who after all had begun their rule in Egypt 
as foreign occupiers.25
 After the battle, the Egyptian forces scatter and panic 
erupts as the citizens of Cairo attempt to flee before the French 
reach the city. Al-Jabarti describes the chaos in great detail, say-
ing that “the people were in great confusion and perplexity in 
addition to the fear, panic, and alarm that possessed them” and 
how rich and poor alike took flight.26 Those who had the means 
“carried…those possessions which were portable and necessary” 
while the less well-off “concealed their decision from their friends 
and neighbors, trying to escape from their relatives and compan-
ions, fearing less they say ‘Take me’ or ‘Carry me with you.’”27 In 
addition to chaos and the threat of the French, once they had “left 
the gates of Cairo behind, and were in the open countryside the 
bedouin and fellahin confronted [the refugees], plundering most 
of them.”28
 The fall of Cairo marked the transition of the French role 
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in Egypt from invaders to occupiers. Having taken the capital, Na-
poleon next created three levels of government with which to run 
the country. While the military and civil service remained purely 
French, Napoleon also relied on the traditional Muslim elite to 
“cope with the daily administration of the capital” and to provide 
a façade of legitimacy to the French regime.29 The most important 
element of this Egyptian government was the Diwan, a council of 
nine ministers inherited from the Ottoman administrative struc-
ture.30 Al-Jabarti, who later was himself appointed to a Diwan, 
devotes a considerable portion of his chronicle to describing its 
operation.31
 After issuing letters of safe conduct to the Egyptian nota-
bles who had fled, the French then begin to establish the Diwan, in 
keeping with the declaration in Napoleon’s proclamation that “the 
intelligent and virtuous and learned (‘ulama’) amongst them, will 
regulate their affairs, and thus the state of the whole population 
will be rightly adjusted.”32 Despite an initial ban on all persons of 
Mamluk blood, and the official pretext for the French invasion, 
they ultimately grant a number of important government positions 
to Mamluk sheikhs because “the people of Cairo feared only the 
Mamluk race.”33 However, al-Jabarti immediately demonstrates 
the Diwan’s powerlessness in his description of the response to 
the continued looting of houses:
The French asked “Why are they doing this after we or-
dered you to guard the houses, to seal off the property 
of the Mamluks, and to stop those who oppose this ef-
fectively?” They replied “This is a matter which we had 
not the power to prevent, for indeed it is the business of 
the rulers.” So the Wali and the Agha went and declared 
safe-conduct, and asked the people to open the shops and 
to stop the plundering. But they did not stop…34
 In addition to its inability to control the behavior of the 
Egyptian people, the Diwan was also largely subject to the whims 
of the French.35 When the French leveled duties on the Egyptians, 
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keeping with the declaration in Napoleon’s proclamation that “the 
intelligent and virtuous and learned (‘ulama’) amongst them, will 
regulate their affairs, and thus the state of the whole population 
will be rightly adjusted.”32 Despite an initial ban on all persons of 
Mamluk blood, and the official pretext for the French invasion, 
they ultimately grant a number of important government positions 
to Mamluk sheikhs because “the people of Cairo feared only the 
Mamluk race.”33 However, al-Jabarti immediately demonstrates 
the Diwan’s powerlessness in his description of the response to 
the continued looting of houses:
The French asked “Why are they doing this after we or-
dered you to guard the houses, to seal off the property 
of the Mamluks, and to stop those who oppose this ef-
fectively?” They replied “This is a matter which we had 
not the power to prevent, for indeed it is the business of 
the rulers.” So the Wali and the Agha went and declared 
safe-conduct, and asked the people to open the shops and 
to stop the plundering. But they did not stop…34
 In addition to its inability to control the behavior of the 
Egyptian people, the Diwan was also largely subject to the whims 
of the French.35 When the French leveled duties on the Egyptians, 
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the Diwan occasionally succeeded in reducing the tax or extend-
ing the time allotted for payment, and it also convinced the occu-
pation to follow the precepts of the Qur’an in determining matters 
of inheritance.36 In the face of a final French decision, however, 
the Diwan remained powerless. Al-Jabarti describes its failure to 
prevent the execution of the sharif (descendent of Muhammad) 
Sayyid Muhammad Kurayyim and notes that its members were 
obliged to wear the tricolor revolutionary cockade in the presence 
of French officers.37 More significantly, the Diwan was suspended 
throughout the duration of the Cairo uprising, indicating both its 
powerlessness to affect the Egyptian people and its uselessness as 
a ruling body to the French in times of strife.38
 While al-Jabarti nevertheless maintains a certain level of 
respect for the initial Diwan, which consisted of traditional Arab 
elites, this is not the case for its second incarnation, staffed by 
“six Copts and six Muslim merchants.”39 Such an arrangement 
was anathema to al-Jabarti’s conservative Muslim worldview, 
and he describes the appointment of Christians and merchants un-
schooled in Islamic law to a ruling body as “establish[ing] a basis 
for malice, a foundation for godlessness, a bulwark for injustice, 
and a source of all manner of evil innovations.”40 As with the ini-
tial French proclamation, al-Jabarti again expresses his frustration 
by criticizing the literary style of the new Diwan’s laws, exclaim-
ing that they are “formulated in their stupid idiom and crude style, 
and all of them dedicated to one purpose, namely robbing people 
of their money by devious means and despoiling them of their real 
estate.”41
 Al-Jabarti’s offense at the assignment of “Copts to judge 
over Muslims in cases where knowledge of the shari‘a was req-
uisite” touches on another Bonapartist inversion of the old order 
of which the Arab historian was unremittingly critical.42 Despite 
his public claims that he was an adherent of Islam, Napoleon re-
mained “a Christian, son of a Christian” in the eyes of the Egyp-
tians, and the minority Christian community benefitted exten-
sively from his invasion.43 Al-Jabarti describes how the Shami 
Christians and “resident Europeans” who acted as intermediaries 
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between the villages and the Diwan “profited from this situation, 
making promises and dire threats, playing tricks, and so on.”44 
The French also relied on Christians to ensure the collection of 
military and civil taxes:
…they appointed tax collectors (sarrafs) from among the 
Copts who went into the country like rulers wreaking hav-
oc among the Muslims with arrests, beatings, insults, and 
ceaseless harassment in their demands for money. Fur-
thermore they terrorized them with threats of bringing in 
the French soldiers if they did not pay up the determined 
amount quickly; all this occurred by means of Copt plan-
ning and trickery.45
 The religious tensions sparked by the favorable position 
granted to the Egyptian Christians, the inability of the Diwans 
to communicate the desires of the Egyptian population, and the 
continuing violence and oppression on the part of the French oc-
cupying forces all ultimately culminated in a massive uprising in 
Cairo on October 21, 1798. Interestingly, al-Jabarti is highly criti-
cal of the Egyptians who took up arms against the French, which 
noted Egyptian historian Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot attributes 
to the “lack of logic, [and] the chaotic and base motives that he 
read into popular movements.”46 He refers to the rebels as “rabble, 
ruffians,” and “riff-raff” with “no leader to guide them or chief to 
rule them” and characterizes the riots as “the deeds of the fool-
ish among the subjects and those who do not consider the conse-
quences of their actions.”47 Al-Jabarti also criticizes the rebels’ 
lack of foresight in failing to appreciate the French preparations 
and military control of the city.48
 However, al-Jabarti’s disdain for the rebels pales in com-
parison to the rancor with which he describes the French reprisals. 
He depicts the French army’s entrance into the city as “a torrent 
rushing through the alleys and streets without anything to stop 
them, like demons of the Devil’s army.”49 The French respond to 
the uprising by sacking the city and exterminating anyone they 
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suspected of aiding the resistance:
…they slaughtered many throwing their bodies into the 
Nile. During these two days (of revolt) and the follow-
ing days so many people died that their number cannot be 
determined. Thus the injustice and obduracy of the unbe-
lievers continued and they achieved their evil intentions 
toward the Muslims.50
 Even more than the widespread executions, al-Jabarti was 
repulsed by the French desecration of the mosque of al-Azhar, 
which had been used as a fortress by the rebels. The French 
shelled the mosque until “their ammunition was finished,” and 
then invaded the holy ground of the mosque itself, killing the 
students and destroying every religious artifact they could find.51 
“On that night,” al-Jabarti laments, “the Lord’s host allowed the 
host of Satan to move freely.”52
 Despite his longstanding cynicism toward the French oc-
cupation, and his utter disgust at the atrocities committed by the 
French army in the wake of the Cairo uprising, al-Jabarti’s de-
scription of his visit to the French Institute is positively glowing. 
The Egyptian scholar “appreciated an interest in learning, wher-
ever and by whosoever it was expressed”53 and in the Muddat he 
openly praises the volume and variety of books the French have 
collected in their library and the devotion of the French scholars.54 
He is especially impressed by French scholarship about Islam, 
remarking that “The glorious Qur’an is translated into their lan-
guage!” and that some French scholars even “know chapters of 
the Qur’an by heart.”55 Despite the many layers of conflict and 
misunderstanding that have alienated the French occupiers from 
the Muslim elite, al-Jabarti nevertheless acknowledges the aca-
demic capabilities of Napoleon’s community of scholars.
 From its first caustic description of Napoleon’s proclama-
tion to the Egyptians through the glowing tribute to the knowl-
edge displayed during his visit to the Institut, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-
Jabarti’s Ta’rikh Muddat al-Faransis provides a series of unique 
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insights into Egyptian life under Napoleonic rule. As a prominent 
‘alim responsible to no one for his own livelihood, al-Jabarti is 
able to criticize openly the failings of Egypt’s Mamluk rulers’ at-
tempts to repulse the French invasion and to chronicle the many 
failures—as well as the occasional successes—of the Diwans in-
stituted by Napoleon in order to provide a layer of Muslim gov-
ernment. However, al-Jabarti’s criticisms are often colored by his 
own perspective as a member of the conservative Muslim elite, 
both in his descriptions of the Egyptians during the fall of Cairo 
and the uprising of October 1798, which are influenced by his 
elitism and disdain for the masses, and in his descriptions of the 
French rulers, which are influenced by his position “witnessing 
the occupation of his country by a military force that was alien in 
language, religion, and ethnicity.”56
 Nevertheless, al-Jabarti is a “historian of high profession-
al standards,” and he both incorporates numerous French sources 
into his work and shows open admiration for the French tradi-
tion of scholarship.57 Ultimately, al-Jabarti embodies Marsot’s 
description of him and his contemporary historian Niqula al-Turk 
as “mirrors of the age, but mirrors that were slightly distorted and 
distorting.”58 His chronicle is shaped by the virtues and prejudices 
of his worldview, but his historical professionalism impels him 
to provide an accurate account of the events of the occupation. 
At the same time, the very emotions that color his writing offer 
a compelling insight into the life of a people caught in a struggle 
between East and West, tradition and modernity, God and revolu-
tion.
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 Ethical constraints, even belief in the wrongness of corrup-
tion, are not universal. In recent years, United States presidential 
and congressional candidates, along with members of the Tea Party 
and 99% movements, have taken up the cry against corruption in 
government, joining a two-hundred-year tradition of opposition 
to corruption. This tradition stretches back to the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, when several politicians, especially 
Southerners like James Jackson of Georgia and John Randolph of 
Roanoke, Virginia, loudly attacked the state of Georgia’s sale of 
most of its western lands to companies with whom many of the 
state’s legislators had ties. Before the “Yazoo Fraud” (I prefer the 
more neutral term “affair”), Americans felt ambivalent toward cor-
ruption based on conflicts of interest: some opposed it, but many 
others saw it as normal. However, in their opposition to the sale, 
Jackson, Randolph, and their allies drew on the new free market 
theory and Jeffersonian anti-aristocratic ideals and brought Amer-
ica off the fence. They turned the Yazoo sale into the first major 
nationally-important scandal in United States history and a conduit 
through which they reinforced anti-conflict-of-interest’s position as 
a key part of American political culture, which it had taken dur-
ing the era of the American Revolution. Congressional debates, 
speeches, correspondence, and newspapers document the Yazoo-
era ideological wrangling over the importance of anti-corruption. 
Anti-Yazooists did not, however, work in a vacuum. Their opinions 
gained widespread acceptance because the decline of feudalism and 
the rise of capitalist and Enlightenment scientific mentality of seg-
mentation had already been underway throughout the previous cen-
tury, leading Americans to develop republican ideals they derived 
from study of classical antiquity. The Yazoo Affair tested Ameri-
cans’ resolve in putting their Revolutionary principles into action.
 Most corruption cases in the United States involve conflicts 
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of interest, where one’s involvement in one activity compromises 
one’s ability to act impartially in another activity. Within govern-
ment, conflicts of interest typically involve “sacrificing all public 
considerations to private advantage,” as Stevens describes the ac-
tions of politicians involved in the Yazoo Affair.1 The Georgian leg-
islators who approved the 1795 Yazoo sale chose their own advan-
tage by taking bribes rather than serving the interests of Georgians, 
who might have asked more money for the lands than the specula-
tors paid. When a politician finds himself in a situation involving 
conflicts of interest, the American public expects him to remove 
himself from the decisions of government that are being made. 
Americans today incorporate this concept of conflict of interest as 
a part of our political culture. Because of the cultural constructs we 
have developed, Americans expect politicians to act fairly, and by 
that we mean impartially. In this way our political culture differs 
distinctly from other political cultures, which would treat as normal 
what most Americans would angrily label corruption.
 By 1776 the British had developed a notion of conflict of 
interest, but still allowed close relationships between government 
and business and religion. Parliament directed the actions of the 
for-profit East India Company and the Anglican Church. Initial-
ly after independence, the conflict of interest concept played an 
equally ambivalent role in American political culture. During the 
anger over taxation in the 1760s and 1770s, many Americans had 
adopted sentiments against conflicts of interest as detrimental to 
the republican system of government that they fought to protect. 
However, until the Yazoo Affair Americans remained ambivalent as 
to how strongly to fight actual cases of conflict of interest. Through 
increasingly virulent language, opponents of the Yazoo sale placed 
new emphasis on anti-corruption beliefs, bringing them more firm-
ly into American political culture.
 Rather few scholars have written on the origins of the con-
cept of conflict of interest, most focusing rather on developing rem-
edies for it. Lankester identifies a case of the concept’s historical 
development in Britain in the eighteenth century, prior to which 
Britons expected officials to partake in some form of self-inter-
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est.2 However, Lankester’s historical brevity leads him to blanket 
statements like the argument that the benevolent altruism of the 
American founding fathers saved the early United States almost 
entirely from corruption; this is untenable romanticism.3 Like the 
other scholars on the topic, Lankester aims at progressive utility, 
attempting to understand how corruption is fostered so that we can 
remove it, but does so within a cultural evolutionist framework that 
treats uncritically the modern Western opposition to conflicts of in-
terest and applies it universally. Wood provides a discussion of the 
background of the idea of conflict of interest as it relates to repub-
licanism, but confines his treatment of the topic mostly to ideologi-
cal rhetoric of the American Revolution rather than specific cases 
in which Americans actually applied the concept to governmental 
policy.4 We therefore need a more solid study of early applications 
of opposition to conflicts of interest.
 In the United States, the Yazoo Affair marks the first major 
application of this form of anti-corruption, but scholarship on the 
affair has yet to address the conflict of interest issue. Stevens treats 
opposition to corruption as natural: “as was developed to them, step 
by step, the various means, and bribes, and machinations, which 
were set to work to bring over, or buy over, the members of the Leg-
islature, to vote for these measures, their indignation rose higher 
and higher.”5 Writing from within American political culture, Ste-
vens takes the side of opponents to the Yazoo sale, calling it a “ne-
farious business.”6 He fails to question the motives of both sides, 
lauding James Jackson while defaming the Yazoo speculators. 
Thus, although he includes many details of the events of the Yazoo 
Affair, his biases compromise much of his utility in determining the 
beliefs behind those actions. One also encounters difficulty verify-
ing his sources because he cites none of them.
 In his 1891 The Yazoo Land Companies, Haskins offers 
perhaps the first solidly historical account of the Yazoo Affair. He 
bases his account mostly on letters, public records, and newspapers 
of the Yazoo period and argues only what he can support, resisting 
the urge to jump to conclusions in the absence of documentation.7 
Unlike Stevens, Haskins maintains a healthy balance in his account 
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and cites his sources. However, he shows interest mainly in what 
happened, offering little insight into the beliefs behind opposition or 
acceptance of the 1795 sale. Similarly, in his 1932 account, Heath 
focuses on events, avoiding “all the great principles and problems 
of government that became involved.”8 He, however, relies on a 
smaller number of more indirect sources: mostly on histories of 
Georgia and a few government records. Probably from the histories 
he uses, he adopts an antagonistic tone toward the Yazooists, us-
ing harsh language for these “corrupt and influential schemers.”9 
Haskins and Heath’s “just the facts” approach and Heath’s biased, 
monochrome telling obscure the worldviews at play and in conflict 
in the Yazoo Affair. Magrath offers the only deep analysis of the Ya-
zoo Affair, interpreting its significance to American constitutional 
law and focusing largely on the judicial aspects of the affair.10 In 
a critical and balanced telling of events, he describes many of the 
immediate cultural influences on the participants in the affair, but 
only as they pertain to the creation of constitutional law. No scholar 
of the Yazoo Affair has yet given intensive treatment of the issue of 
conflict of interest as it developed during the course of the affair. 
Given today’s discussions of corruption, both in the United States 
and abroad, such a treatment is in order.
Before Yazoo
 In the decades before the Yazoo land sale of 1795, Ameri-
cans developed an increasing sensibility toward conflicts of inter-
est. Some spoke out more frequently and adamantly about the im-
portance of electing officials to serve the public good rather than 
their own, but enforcement of this ideal remained lax.
 A perusal of the index for “bribery” in the Virginia Gazette 
shows late development of concern about conflicts of interest. Brib-
ery and related terms do not appear in the Virginia Gazette until 
1769, though the paper ran in various forms from 1736 to 1780. 
When they do appear, the writers, who included people outside Vir-
ginia as well as those within it, rarely wrote about conflicts of in-
terest within legislatures. The paper alleges three cases of the Brit-
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and cites his sources. However, he shows interest mainly in what 
happened, offering little insight into the beliefs behind opposition or 
acceptance of the 1795 sale. Similarly, in his 1932 account, Heath 
focuses on events, avoiding “all the great principles and problems 
of government that became involved.”8 He, however, relies on a 
smaller number of more indirect sources: mostly on histories of 
Georgia and a few government records. Probably from the histories 
he uses, he adopts an antagonistic tone toward the Yazooists, us-
ing harsh language for these “corrupt and influential schemers.”9 
Haskins and Heath’s “just the facts” approach and Heath’s biased, 
monochrome telling obscure the worldviews at play and in conflict 
in the Yazoo Affair. Magrath offers the only deep analysis of the Ya-
zoo Affair, interpreting its significance to American constitutional 
law and focusing largely on the judicial aspects of the affair.10 In 
a critical and balanced telling of events, he describes many of the 
immediate cultural influences on the participants in the affair, but 
only as they pertain to the creation of constitutional law. No scholar 
of the Yazoo Affair has yet given intensive treatment of the issue of 
conflict of interest as it developed during the course of the affair. 
Given today’s discussions of corruption, both in the United States 
and abroad, such a treatment is in order.
Before Yazoo
 In the decades before the Yazoo land sale of 1795, Ameri-
cans developed an increasing sensibility toward conflicts of inter-
est. Some spoke out more frequently and adamantly about the im-
portance of electing officials to serve the public good rather than 
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Jenkins ConfliCt of interest in the Yazoo affair
ish attempting to bribe the Americans into ceasing their rebellion 
(which one can regard as somewhat legitimate as diplomacy);11 one 
case of candidates for office offering bribes to voters;12 one case 
of skimming by customs officials;13 one very general allegation of 
corruption in the British government as reason for leaving Britain,14 
by which the author means corruption by the king of Parliament, 
an issue less relevant in the United States, where there is no king; 
and one recommendation of bribing the British generals to send 
the troops home and leave the colonists to themselves.15 The paper 
reports on only one case of conflict of interest in a legislature, the 
alleged bribing of Parliament, accompanied by the declaration “that 
there is no crime under heaven more enormous, more treacherous, 
and more destructive to the very nature of our government than that 
of bribing of Parliaments.” The Gazette actually ran this story twice 
in the same wording.16 If one can attribute most of the mention of 
bribery between 1774 and 1776, at least in part, to the unusual ten-
sions of the American Revolution, then the Yazoo Affair marks a 
departure from pre-revolutionary levels of concern with corruption 
and the conflicts of interest that lie at the heart of it.
 During the revolution, however, the concept formed a key 
factor in political discourse. As Wood notes, “the sacrifice of indi-
vidual interests to the greater good of the whole formed the essence 
of republicanism and comprehended for Americans the idealistic 
goal of their Revolution.”17 However, Wood may overstate the uni-
versality of adherence to this republican value in America during 
and immediately after the Revolution. During the infancy of the 
United States, conflicts of interest occurred frequently, especially 
in land sales. Ohio Company of Associates member Manasseh Cut-
ler, after agreeing to General Arthur St. Clair’s ascension as gov-
ernor of the newly-created Ohio Territory in 1787, signed a land 
sale with St. Clair and the company’s secretary, Major Winthrop 
Sargent, granting the company of 1,500,000 acres for $1 million in 
government securities worth $180,000 in specie.18 In this case, St. 
Clair presumably felt he owed Cutler for his position. Moreover, 
then-Secretary of the Treasury of the United States William Druer 
held $30,000 of stock in the same Ohio Company.19 Magrath cites 
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influence peddling as a common occurrence within land sales in 
the infancy of the United States.20 In Georgia, the state’s governors 
regularly ignored restrictions on the size of land grants, mixing ser-
vice of the public with service of individuals.21 They also sold non-
existent land or re-sold lands multiple times: 1796 records showed 
29,097,866 acres owned in Georgia’s established counties where 
only 8,717,960 acres actually existed.22 Like an airline over-book-
ing a plane, this over-selling of the land helped put money in Geor-
gia’s coffers but what benefitted the government did not necessarily 
benefit the people, who suffered when they arrived to find that their 
lands either did not exist or that someone else already lived there. 
Conflicts of interest were thus rife in early American history, and 
until the Yazoo Affair, although many opposed them in principle, 
few backed up with action the republican ideal of putting the good 
of the state before one’s personal benefit. Many Americans contin-
ued to view this type of corruption as normal and, to some degree, 
acceptable. Opposition to conflicts of interest was certainly not as 
intense as it would become. The Yazoo Affair changed that situa-
tion, as a few politicians seized on conflict of interest as an issue by 
which to advance their careers.
The Yazoo Affair
 The 1795 Yazoo sale originated quite unremarkably as a 
means for Georgia to pay off its Revolutionary War debts. In the 
1780s, the treaty ending the Revolutionary War left Georgia in 
possession of vast lands between the Chattahoochee and Missis-
sippi Rivers that eventually became the states of Mississippi and 
Alabama. Saddled with war debts and continuing state expenses, 
Georgian politicians began looking to sell these western lands to 
private owners. The Georgian legislature established a County of 
Bourbon in 1785 bordering on the Mississippi River above and be-
low Natchez and appointed officials for a county government, but 
repealed the act three years later under the pressure of conflicting 
land claims from Spanish and British land grants and settlers al-
ready living there. After that failure, several men organized a se-
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cret society called the Combined Society with the express purpose 
of buying land from Georgia and turning a profit. Once word got 
out of the plans, the society disbanded, presumably because they 
had nefarious intent. Some later speculators intended to form a new 
state, break off from the United States, and join the Spanish Em-
pire.23 In 1789, Georgia again attempted to sell a portion of its west-
ern lands, this time to the Virginia, Tennessee, and South Carolina 
Yazoo companies. However, when the companies attempted to pay 
in devalued paper currency John Meals, the Georgia state treasurer, 
rejected their payments. The deal broke down and Georgia refunded 
the deposits it had previously accepted. The South Carolina Yazoo 
Company began a suit against Georgia for breach of contract, but 
the United States Congress soon passed the Eleventh Amendment 
to the Constitution in March of 1794, barring private suits against 
states. This amendment left the South Carolina company no choice 
but to accept Georgia’s refusal to complete the sale.
 On January 7, 1795, Georgia finally managed to sell its 
western lands, granting the Georgia, Georgia Mississippi, Upper 
Mississippi, and Tennessee companies 35 million acres, two thirds 
of Georgia’s western lands, for $500,000 in specie. All but one leg-
islator who voted for the sale held bribes of money or shares from 
the companies purchasing the lands.24 In this respect, the Yazoo 
sale did not differ significantly from earlier land deals. Moreover, 
few initially seemed to worry about the conflict of interest inherent 
in the overlap of making money and making policy. When “one 
representative, Thomas Raburn, was jokingly criticized for selling 
his vote for a mere $600 while his colleagues were getting $1,000, 
he blandly replied that ‘it showed he was easily satisfied and was 
not greedy.’”25 The tones of those involved in this interchange and 
Raburn’s response indicate concern over excessive corruption, not 
corruption in general, and a passing concern at that.
 The Georgia Governor William Ewen vetoed the first 1795 
Yazoo bill but said nothing in his reasons about corruption, argu-
ing rather that the time had not yet come to sell the land, that too 
little was reserved for Georgia’s citizens, that monopolies might not 
be in everyone’s best interest, and that the sums offered were too 
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small.26 Among the earliest opponents of the sale, even before its 
completion, William H. Crawford of Columbia County wrote a pe-
tition that “‘we do conceive it to be bad policy to give a grant to the 
company purchasing before the full amount of the purchase-money 
is paid’” but said nothing about corruption.27 Possibly the news of 
bribery had yet to come out from under the table, but the low sale 
value should have alerted someone to possible bribery. One would 
expect some sort of speculation on it if all Americans were as com-
mitted to opposing conflicts of interest as they became by the end 
of the affair.
 At first, even James Jackson, to become the most vocal 
Georgian in opposition to the bill, voiced no fears over conflicts 
of interest. He had been silent in the 1780s and 1790s as other il-
legal land sales went through in Georgia and, now late in his po-
litical career, had never made opposition to conflicts of interest a 
significant part of his activities. In fact, a few months before the 
1795 sale Jackson wrote his friend John Milledge that “‘I have ac-
tually a good mind to…leave Congress and Congress things, turn 
speculator and go snacks at home with the best of them. There is 
a damn sight more to be got by it, depend on it, and I have not got 
one sixpence ahead, since I undertook [being a Congressman].’”28 
One can only guess as to whether Jackson referred to the profitabil-
ity of speculation in general or the profitability of bribe-taking in 
general, or the bribery associated with the then-approaching 1795 
Yazoo sale. However, he demonstrated in this letter of November 2, 
1794, no opposition at all to conflicts of interest in politics. Jackson 
supported the 1795 sale, until suddenly, almost two months after 
the long-anticipated sale concluded, he condemned “‘the rapacious 
grasping of a few sharks’” and decided to resign his post as United 
States Senator and “‘at risk of life and fortune go home and break 
down the speculation.’”29
 Jackson’s sudden change of heart against the Yazoo sale 
could stem immediately from the outbreak of news about the brib-
ery of the legislature by the land companies involved, which must 
have occurred by early March, 1795. However, people rarely make 
major changes in their lives for a single reason and his likely moti-
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Jenkins ConfliCt of interest in the Yazoo affair
vations indicate considerable conflicts of interest. In addition to his 
brewing discontent with his work in the United States Senate, Jack-
son had a friend in the Georgia Union Company, John Wearat, who 
had directed the company in its unsuccessful bid to become part of 
the 1795 Yazoo deal.30 Jackson may have seen in undoing the 1795 
sale an opportunity to give his friend, and perhaps himself, a sec-
ond chance at speculating in Georgia’s western lands. Ultimately, 
however, Jackson must have seen a move to Georgia to campaign 
against the Yazoo sale as an opportunity for political power. Upon 
his return home Jackson took the leading role in organizing anti-
Yazooists and led them in sweeping elections that fall.
 Jackson and his fellow anti-Yazooists immediately set up 
a committee to investigate the Yazoo sale’s legitimacy. Given his 
connections to the Georgia Union Company and his use of the Ya-
zoo issue to rocket himself to leadership in the Georgia assembly, 
Jackson should, perhaps, by his own logic, have recused himself 
from the committee. How could he have ever found the sale in-
nocent, now that he had taken a stand of career importance against 
it? Yet Jackson proved that campaign rhetoric need not match one’s 
actions: he chaired the committee. Another member of the commit-
tee, William Few, joined Jackson in hypocrisy, for he had actually 
been one of the organizers of the Georgia Union Company.31
 Amidst an atmosphere of allegations of wrongdoing, Gov-
ernor Ewen felt compelled to defend his innocence in the same 
terms as those in which it was attacked:
Endeavors have been made to calumniate my character by 
false reports, such as—“that the motives which induced me 
to give my assent to the second act proceeded from private 
interest, regardless of the sacred duty I owed to the station 
I filled…” Conscious of the purity of my intentions, and 
supported by the justice and integrity of my actions, I have 
treated with silent contempt those base and malicious re-
ports.32
 He writes that once the legislature addressed his initial con-
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cerns with the Yazoo sale, “‘I think there is no man of cool, dispas-
sionate reflection, that would have refused his assent to it for any 
reasons short of a clear proof of corruption in its passage through 
the Legislature, and no such information ever came to my knowl-
edge.’”33 The governor’s remarkably cogent defense corroborates 
Wood’s demonstration that some Americans, at least, had a fully-
formed sense of conflicts of interest by the time of the Yazoo Affair. 
Rather than a radical turning point, the affair marked the opportu-
nity for broad implementation of feelings that had been brewing.
 By the time the Georgia legislature issued the Repeal Act, 
most of the speculators in the land companies had sold the land to 
other buyers. The New England Mississippi Land Company pur-
chased 11,000,000 acres from the Georgia Mississippi Company 
for $1,138,000 the same day the Repeal Act passed, leaving the 
latter company with a 650% profit.34 This situation complicated the 
repeal, for many of the secondary and, later, tertiary buyers, having 
done nothing wrong, refused to give up their claims. One cannot be 
sure how many later buyers knew about the bribery of the Georgia 
legislature, nor how many cared. These later sales made the Yazoo 
Affair nationally significant and Americans from all corners com-
mented on it. Within three months of the 1795 sale, Philadelphia’s 
Aurora, the United States’ leading Republican newspaper, called 
Yazoo “‘melancholy proof of the depravity of human nature.’”35 
Thus the preoccupation with conflict of interest easily spread be-
yond Georgian borders. Many Americans had apparently been con-
templating conflict of interest for some time, but the Yazoo Affair 
brought it into sharp focus for perhaps the first time.
 Most Georgians joined Jackson and his team in opposi-
tion to the Yazoo sale. A Chatham County grand jury issue a state-
ment congratulating “‘our fellow citizens [in the legislature] …
which declared the said pretended sale, constitutionally null and 
void, as fraudulent and corrupt’” and encouraged the election of 
anti-Yazooists in the 1796 election.36 Sharing a Jeffersonian hatred 
of merchants, the Chatham County grand jury declared its hatred 
for speculators, “‘a few men, who are void of principle and honour, 
who would sacrifice their country and its rights to increase their 
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own property.’”37 These anti-Yazooists built their arguments around 
distrust of the imbalances of power created by complex markets in 
which middlemen and financiers made money without, allegedly, 
having worked for it. Building from Revolutionary ideals, they 
wanted a land where personal virtue determined politicians’ ac-
tions. The Yazoo Affair gave its opponents an opportunity to define 
virtue as lack of conflicts of interest.
 Americans from other states joined the Georgians. In 1797 
Connecticut’s Abraham Bishop called the affair “‘aiming with 
feathers [pens] to cut throats, and on parchments to seal destruc-
tion,—these are the robbers of modern days.—they bring desola-
tion among our farmers.’”38 The nation divided between Federal-
ists strongest in the north, who generally supported the Yazoo sale 
out of a mercantilist conception of “an alliance of government and 
wealth,”39 and Republicans, strongest in the south, generally anti-
Yazooist out of laissez-faire economics40 and a desire to let Georgia 
decide Georgia’s issues. Ownership of the Yazoo lands became a 
standoff, with anti-Yazooists on one side declaring the 1795 sale 
null and void and claimants and their supporters (the Yazooists) on 
the other side arguing that the legislature had no power to undo a 
sale and that claims upon the 1795 sale stood as valid.
 In 1803, after discussions beginning in 1798, the United 
States federal government inherited the problem when it bought 
the land from Georgia and shifted the debate over the Yazoo issue 
to Congress. There, proponents and opponents further entrenched 
their positions and tensions continued to climb, elevating the na-
tion’s attention to the affair and thus its impact on the American 
public. In Congress, despite all the talk of corruption since 1795, 
congressmen only rarely bowed out due to conflicts of interest. 
While Congress debated buying the land in 1800, Representative 
Samuel Sewall of Massachusetts, a Yazoo claimant for 113,000 
acres via the New England Mississippi Company, “reported to the 
House the findings of a committee appointed to study the petitions 
of certain Yazoo claimants who sought compensation.41 He recom-
mended [not surprisingly] that their claims be honored.”42 Only 
later, when others challenged his impartiality, did he abstain from 
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tions. The Yazoo Affair gave its opponents an opportunity to define 
virtue as lack of conflicts of interest.
 Americans from other states joined the Georgians. In 1797 
Connecticut’s Abraham Bishop called the affair “‘aiming with 
feathers [pens] to cut throats, and on parchments to seal destruc-
tion,—these are the robbers of modern days.—they bring desola-
tion among our farmers.’”38 The nation divided between Federal-
ists strongest in the north, who generally supported the Yazoo sale 
out of a mercantilist conception of “an alliance of government and 
wealth,”39 and Republicans, strongest in the south, generally anti-
Yazooist out of laissez-faire economics40 and a desire to let Georgia 
decide Georgia’s issues. Ownership of the Yazoo lands became a 
standoff, with anti-Yazooists on one side declaring the 1795 sale 
null and void and claimants and their supporters (the Yazooists) on 
the other side arguing that the legislature had no power to undo a 
sale and that claims upon the 1795 sale stood as valid.
 In 1803, after discussions beginning in 1798, the United 
States federal government inherited the problem when it bought 
the land from Georgia and shifted the debate over the Yazoo issue 
to Congress. There, proponents and opponents further entrenched 
their positions and tensions continued to climb, elevating the na-
tion’s attention to the affair and thus its impact on the American 
public. In Congress, despite all the talk of corruption since 1795, 
congressmen only rarely bowed out due to conflicts of interest. 
While Congress debated buying the land in 1800, Representative 
Samuel Sewall of Massachusetts, a Yazoo claimant for 113,000 
acres via the New England Mississippi Company, “reported to the 
House the findings of a committee appointed to study the petitions 
of certain Yazoo claimants who sought compensation.41 He recom-
mended [not surprisingly] that their claims be honored.”42 Only 
later, when others challenged his impartiality, did he abstain from 
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voting on the Yazoo issue.43 James Gunn, leading organizer of one 
of the Yazoo companies, continued to head a Senate committee 
dealing with Yazoo issues.44 Samuel Dexter, a congressman from 
1792 to 1797 and secretary of war under President Adams, also 
served as “one of the [New England Mississippi] company’s orga-
nizers and major directors and purchased rights to over 1 million 
acres.45 Gideon Granger, Jefferson’s postmaster general, had a stake 
of 160,000 acres in the same company and was half of a two-man 
team leading Yazoo claimant lobbying during the Jefferson admin-
istration. No one said that he had unfair access to the president. At 
the most extreme, Joseph Story entered the House of Representa-
tives in 1808 after lengthy service as the New England Mississippi 
Company’s paid lobbyist in Washington. On his election, Ezekiel 
Bacon wrote Story, “‘I shall with much pleasure resign into your 
hands next winter the sole management of Yazooism in the national 
councils,’” indicating that he expected Story to continue his lob-
bying from within the House.46 After thirteen years of talk about 
Yazoo corruption, American political culture remained effectively 
unchanged.
 Even if few things changed, it was not for want of trying. 
Republican John Randolph of Roanoke, Virginia, led Congressio-
nal anti-Yazooism. An aggressive anti-capitalist and proponent of 
states’ rights and agriculture, Magrath calls Randolph “more Jef-
fersonian than Jefferson.”47 Randolph also experienced periodical 
insanity that enhanced his rhetorical brilliance, only enabling him 
to heighten the emotion of his attacks on the Yazooists. In an 1805 
speech published in the National Intelligencer, Randolph alleged 
that Senator James Gunn and Supreme Court Justice James Wil-
son, by that time deceased, had died because “‘private character, 
always dear, always to be respected, seems almost canonized by 
the grave. When men go hence their evil deeds should follow them, 
and, for me, might sleep oblivious in their tomb.’”48 In such a way 
Randolph elevated the stakes of the Yazoo Affair to the afterlife, 
exacerbating the rhetoric of anti-conflict-of-interest politics. In-
creases in the strength of rhetoric in legislatures affect the wider 
public when the press publicizes them, as in this case. Randolph’s 
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emotional anti-Yazooist stance probably stirred the emotions of the 
National Intelligencer’s readers, causing anti-corruption to move 
closer to the center of American hearts and minds. Randolph forced 
his readers to take a stand on this particular case, but ultimately the 
decision lay not with the public.
 The United States Supreme Court upheld the Yazoo claim-
ants’ titles in Fletcher v. Peck in 1810, ruling that whatever the 
rightness or wrongness of the 1795 sale, it could not be undone, 
but debate continued on the Yazoo issue and vicious rhetoric per-
sisted unabated, continuing to attract national attention to the Yazoo 
conflicts of interest. Not until 1814 did Congress finally settle with 
the claimants and lay the matter, for the most part, to rest. In that 
year Congress set aside lands and up to $5 million to compensate 
the claimants for their purchases and the lost productivity during 
the period of the controversy. But before they reached that final 
decision the extremity of rhetoric, particularly from anti-Yazooists, 
reached new heights. In the final debate of March, 1814, George 
Troupe, Randolph’s replacement as lead anti-Yazooist, held forth 
a gloriously incomprehensible tirade, in direct conflict with the 
Fletcher v. Peck ruling, that giving the speculators any sort of com-
pensation would “‘legalize fraud and corruption.’” He stated,
Do not believe, sir, that the corruption in which this trans-
action was engendered was a corruption of any ordinary 
character; it was a corruption without example in history; 
may it never find a parallel! Not merely were the corrupted 
corrupted by the corrupters—the corrupters cheated the 
corrupted—the corrupters cheated one another, and the cor-
rupters, as they say, cheated these claimants.49
 Meanwhile, John Eppes turned to allegorical extremes: 
“‘Polyphemus in his den, wallowing in human gore, was not a more 
odious and detestable animal than a Yazoo speculator.’”50 The com-
pensation bill became law on the 31st of that month, but it left be-
hind it a trail of violently polarized rhetoric, increasingly vehement 
on the part of the anti-Yazooists, whose vivid attacks on conflicts 
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of interest from 1795 to 1814 enlivened American interest in anti-
corruption. In the end, the anti-Yazooists lost the battle against the 
1795 sale, but they succeeded in focusing American attention on 
the issues of corruption at a level previously unmet. In doing so 
they forced Yazooists to drop support for the original sale’s legiti-
macy from their arguments by the early 1800s. Anti-Yazooists also 
deepened the entrenchment of conflict of interest as a fundamental 
concept in American political rhetoric.
Broader Contexts
 A brief historical comparison of American and British 
political cultures in the early modern period may help illuminate 
the relationship between individuals and larger forces in changing 
structures of perception of, and active opposition to, conflicts of in-
terest. Americans came to view corruption as a problem at approxi-
mately the same time as did the British, in part because the two 
societies shared in many socio-economic developments during the 
eighteenth century, during most of which Britain held what became 
the United States as its colonies. If James Jackson, the initial prin-
ciple driver behind the anti-Yazooist cause that brought opposition 
to conflicts of interest into the heart of American political culture, 
acted largely for selfish motives, a host of others took up his cry 
because American society, like British society, was already moving 
into a form of democracy in which Americans found support for an 
anti-corruption ideology.
 At the start of the early modern period, before the founding 
of Jamestown, Britain and most of Europe operated under a medi-
eval feudal system of government that slowly declined throughout 
the period due to the rise of the modern state and of capitalist eco-
nomic structures. Feudalism existed as a kind of patron-client social 
contract in which a group accepted the rule of a noble in exchange 
for services the noble rendered to them like protection, construction 
of mills, maintaining the peace, and adjudicating disagreements.51 
For example, a noble’s vassals accepted the noble’s right to charge 
rates at the mill that benefitted him because he had put forth the 
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money to build it. Although by the time of the colonization of Brit-
ish America the feudal system was in decline in Britain, elements 
of it survived into the eighteenth century and Americans initially 
shared in at least part of Britain’s feudal social structure and cul-
ture.52 For example, Lord Fairfax lived on a large estate in northern 
Virginia, while Carolina’s 1669 constitution set 1/3 of the colony’s 
landmass aside for eight signatories for colony proprietors, who 
were expected in return to serve as “admirals, chamberlains, chan-
cellors, constables, chief justices, high stewards, and treasurers,” 
as well as eight baronies for nobles.53 In Britain, the breakdown of 
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men and women on the throne exerted enough power that could 
lead England to ruin. As Wood writes,
A poison had entered the nation and was turning the people 
and the government into “one mass of corruption.” One the 
eve of the Revolution the belief that England was “sunk in 
corruption” and “tottering on the brink of destruction” had 
become entrenched in the minds of disaffected Englishmen 
on both sides of the Atlantic.56 
 However, the experiences of the Civil War and Revolu-
tion had at that time given Englishmen over only to thinking about 
conflicts of interest between branches of government. In addition, 
when some, drawing on Classical writings, championed “frugality, 
industry, temperance, and simplicity—the rustic traits of the sturdy 
yeoman,” which they believed threatened by excessive wealth of 
the kind that produced “‘minds stupified, and bodies enervated, by 
wallowing for ever in one continual puddle of voluptuousness,’” 
the writers focused largely on the corrupting power of too much 
wealth, not specifically the relationship between business and gov-
ernment that we recognize today as the basis for conflicts of inter-
est.57
 Yet, in the era of the American Revolution, many Ameri-
cans began to redefine the ideal from which corruption guided men, 
redefining corruption in the process. They began to argue that re-
publicans “‘instructed from early infancy to deem themselves the 
property of the State…were ever ready to sacrifice their concerns 
to her interests.’”58 Throwing off nobility and adopting capitalist 
democracy, Americans began to write of conflicts of interest in the 
sense in which they applied to the Yazoo Affair, and in the sense 
that we now know them.
 Although the 1795 Yazoo sale involved no nobles, it dis-
played a few vestigial characteristics of feudal structures. Under 
feudalism, the king granted land to nobles, but could not grant land 
to himself because he already owned it all. However, under democ-
racy one could conceivably grant lands to oneself. Nobles could, 
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Jenkins ConfliCt of interest in the Yazoo affair
under feudalism, also buy nobility, which usually came with land 
grants, and did so increasingly during the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, in a way not dissimilar to that in which the Yazoo 
land companies bought the Georgia legislature. Thus the Yazoo sale 
represented a different kind of government carrying a quite similar 
kind of land grant. In fact, early in his anti-Yazoo campaign, James 
Jackson called the sale founded on “‘principles of aristocracy.’”59 
Americans had to decide, in the late eighteenth century, how dif-
ferent from their British heritage they wanted to be. As Lankester 
writes, Britain at the time was also moving away from feudalism 
and its acceptance of corruption as normal.60 However, with the en-
couragement of Jackson, Randolph, and their fellows, Americans 
took the step toward anti-corruption on their own. Anti-Yazooists 
built, in their rhetoric, a channel through which Americans guided 
the democratic, free-market ideas of the times, moving opposition 
to conflicts of interest into the place it now holds in American po-
litical culture. Thus, the history of the Yazoo Affair demonstrates 
that individuals play the key roles in effecting paradigmatic cultural 
change. Americans might not view conflicts of interest in such a 
negative light today if Anti-Yazooists had not objected so vocally 
to them in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
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